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Lawyers and the Defense of the Presidency 
Nelson Lund 
I am not afraid to say that the doctrine of self-interest properly 
understood appears to me the best suited of all philosophical 
theories to the wants of men in our time and that I see it as 
their strongest remaining guarantee against themselves. 
Contemporary moralists therefore should give most of their 
attention to it. Though they may well think it incomplete, they 
must nonetheless adopt it as necessary.' 
President Clinton's first White House Counsel: Bernard 
Nussbaum, was pressured into resigning his post after a 
special prosecutor began looking into meetings he had held 
with officials of an independent regulatory agency. These 
meetings, which dealt with the agency's investigations of 
fmancial dealings in which the President and his wife had been 
involved before they came to Washington, were immediately 
and almost universally denounced. Clearly bitter at having lost 
his job because of a standard of conduct having more to  do with 
appearances of impropriety than with legal rules, Nussbaum 
claimed that he was the victim of people "who do not 
* Associate Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law. 
Ph.D., Harvard University 1981; J.D., University of Chicago 1985. 
While serving at the White House as associate counsel to the president from 
1989 to 1992, I participated in many of the matters discussed here; all facts 
directly relied on for this analysis are matters of public record or common 
knowledge. For helpful comments on an earlier draft, I am grateful to  Neal Devins, 
Harvey Flaumenhaft, Stephen G. Gilles, Mara S. Lund, John 0. McGinnis, Geoffrey 
P. Miller, Stephen G. Rademaker, and Nicholas P. Wise. Generous financial 
support was provided by the Sarah Scaife Foundation and the John M. Olin 
Foundation, and William Loeffler offered able research assistance. The author 
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1. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVZUE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 572 (J.P. Mayer ed., 
1969). 
2. Throughout this article, I will use 'White House counsel" interchangeably 
with the more formal term "counsel to the president." 
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understand, nor wish to understand the role and obligations of 
a lawyer, even one acting as White House Co~nsel."~ 
Nussbaum seems to have believed that the job of a 
lawyer-any lawyer-is to act as aggressively as possible to  
protect the interests of the individual who retains him, so long 
as his actions are "consistent with the rules of law, standards 
of ethics, and the highest traditions of the Bar.'" Nussbaum's 
view was soon attacked by his predecessor from the Bush 
administration, C. Boyden Gray, who said: "He confused his 
fiduciary role as a temporary occupant of that office with the 
no-holds-barred role a private litigant would have. He is not 
[the Clintons'] private lawyer. He is the lawyer for the Oval 
Office." Nussbaum's successor, Lloyd Cutler, also rejected the 
applicability of the private-lawyer model. When the President 
announced his appointment, Cutler said: 
The Counsel is supposed to be counsel for the President in 
office and for the Office of the Presidency, as many people 
have said. Most of the time, those two standards coincide. 
Almost always the advice you would give the President is 
advice that is in the interest of the Office of the 
Presidency. . . . When it comes to a President's private affairs, 
particularly private affairs that occurred before he took office, 
those should be handled by his own personal private counsel 
and, in my view, not by the White House C~unse l .~  
As this is written,' the Clintons and Nussbaum have 
steadily maintained that they committed no illegal or unethical 
acts. Although this article is not concerned with the events 
surrounding Nussbaum's resignation, those events provide a 
striking illustration of the somewhat uneasy professional and 
institutional relationships between presidents and their closest 
legal advisors. Whatever may come to light in the continuing 
investigations of the Clinton administration, we can be sure 
that this will not be the last eruption of controversy about the 
proper relationship between presidents and their legal advisors 
3. See The Whitewater Inquiry: Text of Resignation Letter and Clinton Reply, 
N.Y. TIMES, March 6, 1994, !j 1, at 23, col. 1. 
4. Id. 
5. Naftali Bendavid, Whitewater Meets the Washington Legal Culture, LEGAL 
TIMES, March 14, 1994, at 1, 14 (quoting C. Boyden Gray). 
6. Remarks Announcing the Appointment of Lloyd Cutler as Special Counsel 
to the President and an Exchange With Reporters, 30 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 
462, 465 (March 8, 1994). 
7. November 1994. 
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in the government. Ever since Watergate made the distinctions 
among the president's various personal and official interests in  
his office a subject of close public scrutiny, the history of that 
office has looked as much like a battle among lawyers as it has 
a contest between presidents and their political opponents. 
One legacy of Watergate has been an intense interest, 
often politically motivated, in  the ethics of those who serve in  
the upper reaches of government, along with a proliferation of 
new laws ostensibly aimed at curbing unethical conduct by 
government  official^.^ And one consequence of that legacy has 
been a growth in the size of the office of the White House 
Counsel, which plays a preeminent role in seeking to prevent 
ethical embarrassments from impeding the president's 
substantive agenda.g Mr. Nussbaum's government career 
foundered on the treacherous ethical rocks that have been 
thrown around the shores of the presidency, a fate that has 
become almost commonplace among senior officials during the 
last two decades.'' 
The preoccupation with ethics in government is the most 
obvious lingering effect of the Watergate affairs, but it may not 
be the most important. This article will consider a less visible 
aftermath of Watergate: the increasing si@icance of disputes 
that generally fall under the rubric of separation of powers. 
President Nixan, of course, tried unsuccessfully to invoke the 
8. The most important of these laws is the Ethics in Government Ad of 
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 2, 5, 18, and 28 U.S.C.). Other major examples include: Government in the 
Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 5 U.S.C., 5 U.S.C. app., and 39 U.S.C.); Presidential Records Act of 
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-591, 92 Stat. 2523 (codified at  44 U.S.C. $8 2201-2207); 
Ethics Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-194, 103 Stat. 1716 (codified in 
scattered sections of 2, 3, 5, 18, 28, & 31 U.S.C.). 
9. For an insightful summary of the history of this aspect of the White 
House Counsel's office, see Jeremy Rabkin, At the President's Sde: The Role of the 
White House Counsel in Constitutional Policy, LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBs., Autumn 
1993, at  63, 72-76. The many functions performed by the Office of the Counsel to 
the President in recent years are described briefly in BRADLEY H. PATTERSON, JR., 
THE RING OF POWER 141-50 (1988). 
10. The course that led Nussbaum to the White House Counsel's office began 
when he worked as a staff lawyer for the House Judiciary Committee as it was 
considering the impeachment of President Nixon, where he worked with a young 
staf'f aide named Hillary Rodham. Stephen Labaton, New Role for White House 
Counsel: De Facto Attorney General, N.Y. TIMES, March 9, 1993, at  A14, col. 1. 
Further research would be needed in order to determine whether the connection 
between Nussbaum's two ventures into national politics constitute an odd 
coincidence, or an example of poetic justice. 
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constitutional separation of powers to prevent his own 
downfall. As emboldened congresses and a more belligerent 
press have sought to subject subsequent presidents to tighter 
and tighter controls, those presidents have also invoked the 
Constitution to protect themselves from encroachments on their 
freedom of action. Some of these disputes have arisen from the 
post-Watergate ethics laws," but they have not by any means 
been limited to this context. Because recent turf fights between 
presidents and their adversaries have often been waged in legal 
and constitutional terms, lawyers who specialize in the 
separation of powers have become much more prominent than 
they once were. The function of articulating a principled 
defense of presidents and the presidency-mostly from 
congressional incursions-is carried out primarily by those who 
serve in the Office of the Counsel to the President a t  the White 
House and in the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel 
("OLC"), to which the Attorney General's legal advisory 
function has largely been delegated.12 The rise of this species 
of presidential lawyer is worthy of considerable attention, both 
for its intrinsic intellectual interest and because it can be 
expected to have continuing effects on the political life of our 
nation. l3 
The comments that Gray and Cutler offered when 
Nussbaum resigned his office1* exemplify the conventional 
wisdom among this new breed of presidential lawyer about the 
proper relationship between them and their client. Cutler and 
Gray agree that government lawyers may not properly serve as 
the president's personal attorney, and in this they are surely 
correct. But they also agree that the office of the presidency 
should, at least to some extent or in some circumstances, be 
11. E-g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U:S. 654 (1988) (constitutional challenge to 
the Independent Counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978). 
12. OLC is a small office, headed by an Assistant Attorney General, which is 
usually staffed by twenty-odd lawyers. The office ads  as general counsel for the 
Department of Justice and as outside counsel for the White House and for the 
executive departments and agencies. 
13. As Professor Geoffrey P. Miller has pointed out, legal bureaucracies that 
deal with separation of powers issues have grown up in both the executive and 
legislative departments of government, so that disputes that might once have been 
resolved through political accommodation are now more likely to be c h a ~ e l e d  into 
the courts. See Geoffrey P. Miller, From Compromise to Confintation: Separation 
of Powers in the Reagan Era, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 401 (1989). If this trend 
continues, the law of the separation of powers should become more complex and 
more practically sigdicant . 
14. Supra text surrounding notes 5 and 6. 
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regarded as the real client to whom the president's lawyers owe 
their professional loyalty. I believe this is incorrect in several 
respects. First, it has no basis in the law. Second, it 
exaggerates the professional obligations and constitutional role 
of the lawyers, while suggesting an unduly restricted view of 
the president's own role and obligations. Third, the moralistic 
romanticism of the Gray and Cutler vision obscures the 
economy of incentives that actually determines much of what 
presidents and their lawyers actually do. 
This article seeks to present a more realistic 
understanding of the work that is and can be done by those 
who advise the president about his constitutional rights and 
responsibilities. I argue that the role of lawyers in defending 
the presidency is determined primarily by the operation of 
ordinary incentive structures, rather than by legal 
requirements or professional norms. The potential influence of 
these lawyers, moreover, is sharply constrained by those same 
incentive structures, and especially by the fact that the 
president faces different incentives than his legal advisors. I 
conclude that as a result of these constraints, the principled 
defense of the office of the presidency cannot become a 
significant element of any president's agenda, even if the 
president wants it to be. For the reasons suggested by 
Tocq~eville,'~ this analysis is not the enemy of professional 
obligation or constitutional responsibility, but their friend. The 
doctrine of self-interest properly understood may be incomplete, 
but it is the strongest guarantee against our lawyers and our 
presidents. 
Part I1 explains the analytical framework used in this 
article, and contrasts it with other approaches that dominate 
the existing academic literature. The following sections of the 
article provide a detailed case study to support the conclusions 
suggested by the analysis used here. Part I11 explores the Bush 
administration's unprecedented effort to  implement a serious 
and systematic legal strategy for the defense of the presidency. 
This strategy unquestionably had visible results, but it also 
generated compromises that were often more important, though 
much less conspicuous. Part IV examines three major incidents 
in which the administration's legal strategy was simply 
abandoned. I argue that these incidents were, on the whole, 
15. See supra note 1. 
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more significant than the cases in which the strategy was 
actually pursued. Part V analyzes the Bush administration's 
single most aggressive attempt to carry out its program, and 
explains how and why it completely missed its goal, leading 
instead to a setback for the program. Part VI offers some 
concluding observations. 
11. FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS 
The increased legalization of ethics and the increased 
legalization of turf battles between the legislature and the 
executive have a common origin in Watergate, but they have 
also had a common effect: enhancing the influence of lawyers in 
the White House and in OLC. To see why this has occurred, 
consider for a moment the roles played by most of the senior 
political appointees in the executive departments and agencies, 
such as cabinet secretaries. In theory, these are supposed to  be 
the president's representatives in the permanent bureaucracy, 
giving policy direction in the light of an agenda set by the 
single popularly elected possessor of the executive power of the 
United States? In practice, these officials inevitably serve 
both as the president's representatives in the agencies and as 
representatives to the White House for the bureaucracies and 
their congressional and interest-group overseers. These 
conflicting roles can be balanced in different ways, and with 
greater or lesser success, depending on a great variety of 
circumstances. What is important for present purposes is 
simply to note that the remedies for failing t o  balance these 
roles successfully are entirely political. Political appointees can 
be fired by the president, and can be subjected to  various lesser 
kinds of pressure and embarrassment from the White House. 
Similarly, an agency's congressional superintendents can often 
exert a considerable countervailing influence on its political 
managers because of legislators' discretion to grant and 
withhold appropriations, provide desirable enabling legislation, 
inflict unflattering publicity through hearings and 
investigations, and take other steps that will cause political 
appointees to appear as successes or failures. 
16. For obvious reasons, I am not referring in the present context to the so- 
called "independent agencies," which have been statutorily insulated from the 
president's control through restrictions on his removal power. 
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The president's principal legal advisors have an apparently 
very different set of roles. Unlike the various interests that 
political managers are expected to balance politically, the law 
binds everyone, including the president. As oracles of the law, 
therefore, attorneys can in effect issue commands to their 
nominal superiors in a way that others cannot. As ethics laws 
have become increasingly complex and arcane, those who are 
expert in their interpretation have naturally become more 
important and more powerful. And, as disputes over the 
allocation of power between the executive and the legislature 
have become more legalistic, experts in this branch of 
constitutional law have also become more important and more 
powerful. The most important authorities on ethics and 
separation of powers, moreover, are largely found in the same 
small group of people who work at  the White House Counsel's 
Office and in 0LC.17 
17. Within the White House, the Counsel's office handles both ethics and 
separation of powers issues. OLC is well known for its role in separation of powers 
issues, and somewhat less well known for its role on ethics issues. The government 
is permeated with "designated agency ethics officers" (often an agency's general 
counsel), who provide day-to-day ethics advice. There is also a specialized Office of 
Government Ethics that serves primarily as a source of technical knowledge and 
advice about ethics issues. OLC, however, routinely makes final decisions about 
particularly important or sensitive issues involving the interpretation of the ethics 
statutes, just as it does with respect to other laws. For samples of important 
ethics rulings by OLC, see Application of Conflict of Interest Rules to Members of 
Advisory Committees, 14 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 87 (1990) (preliminary print); 
Application of Federal Bribery Statute to Civilian Aide to the Secretary of the 
Army, 13 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 244 (1989) (preliminary print); Applicability of 18 
U.S.C. 8 211 to Department Monetary Awards, 13 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 332 
(1989) (preliminary print); Ethical Considerations Regarding Charitable or Political 
Activities of Department Spouses, 13 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 422 (1989) 
(preliminary print); Whether the One Year Bar Prohibiting Certain Former 
Government Employees from Contacting Their Former Agency Contained in 18 
U.S.C. 8 207(c) Applies to Former Government Employees Who are Working for the 
President-elect's Transition Team, 12 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 339 (1988); Waiver of 
the Application of Conflict of Interest Laws for Members of the President's 
Commission on Strategic Forces, 7 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 10 (1983); Restrictions 
on a Federal Appointee's Continued Employment by a Private Law Firm, 7 Op. 
Off. Legal Counsel 123 (1983); Review of Agency Schedule C Appointments by the 
Executive Office of the President, 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 114 (1982); Attribution 
of Outside Earned Income Under the Ethics in Government Act, 6 Op. Off. Legal 
Counsel 124 (1982); Payment of Expenses Associated with Travel by the President 
and Vice President, 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 214 (1982); Acceptance of Legal Fees 
by United States Attorney, 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 602 (1982); Procedures for 
Investigating Allegations Concerning Senior Administration Officials, 6 Op. Off. 
Legal Counsel 626 (1982); Payment of Legal Fees in Connection with a Cabinet 
Member's C o b a t i o n  Hearings, 5 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 126 (1981); 
Computation of 90-Day Period for Preliminary Investigation Under the Special 
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If lawyers were, or could be, simply the voice of the law, it 
might be appropriate to treat them very differently from other 
political officials in the government. But politically appointed 
lawyers obviously have interests and obligations that are quite 
similar to those of political managers, such as protecting and 
advancing their own reputations and promoting the president's 
agenda. To appreciate the special role played by lawyers who 
specialize in the separation of powers, one must begin by 
understanding more precisely how they differ from other 
political appointees, and how they are the same. 
A. Legal Ethics and the Role of the President's Legal Adu isors 
Among the more salient features of most commentaries on 
the advisory function of the presidential lawyer is the exag- 
geration of the deep and inherent tensions that are supposed to 
exist between the political and professional obligations of those 
responsible for providing the president with legal advice. Real 
tensions between these obligations undoubtedly do exist, but 
the dilemmas that result are typically specious. Lawyers who 
work for the president without f d y  sharing his political goals, 
for example, have an obvious incentive to wrap their own politi- 
cal agenda in the guise of professional obligations. Similarly, 
those who wish to influence an  administration's conduct have 
an obvious incentive to encourage the president's lawyers to 
Prosecutor Act, 5 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 397 (1981); Constitutionality of the 
Disclosure Provisions of the Ethics in Government Act as Applied to Officials' 
Spouses, 4B Op. Off. Legal Counsel 340 (1980); Applicability of Criminal Statutes 
and 'Whistleblower" Legislation to Unauthorized Employee Disclosures, 4B Op. Off. 
Legal Counsel 383 (1980); Application of Conflict of Interest Rules to the Conduct 
of Government Litigation by Private Attorneys, 4B Op. Off. Legal Counsel 434 
(1980); Supersession by the Ethics in Government Act of Other Financial 
Disclosure Requirements, 4B Op. Off. Legal Counsel 566 (1980); Severance 
Agreement Between a Prospective Federal Appointee and His Law Firm, 4B Op. 
Off. Legal Counsel 605 (1980); The President-Interpretation of 18 U.S.C. $ 603 as 
Applicable to Activities in the White House, 3 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 31 (1979); 
Ethics in Government Ad-Financial ReportApplication to Spouses and Children 
of Reporting Official (5 U.S.C.A. App I), 3 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 280 (1979); 
Conflict of In teres t18 U.S.C. $ 207-Applicability to the General Accounting 
Office, 3 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 433 (1979); Conflicts of Interest (18 U.S.C. 
$ 207&American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility, 2 Op. Off. 
Legal Counsel 162 (1978); The White House Office-Expenditure of Appropriated 
Funds-Handling Mail for Members of the President's Family, 2 Op. Off. Legal 
Counsel 343 (1977); The White House-The Vice PresidentGifts (3 U.S.C. $8 110, 
111; 16 U.S.C. $ 6a), 2 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 349 (1977); Conflict of 
InterestStatus of an Informal Presidential Advisor as a "Special Government 
Employee," 1 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 20 (1977). 
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resist his agenda in the name of supposedly professional con- 
siderations. Exaggeration of the tension in the role of presiden- 
tial legal advisor has had real effects on the public discourse 
about the role of lawyers in government, and on the academic 
literature about the functioning of legal bureau~racies.'~ 
The principal alternative views about the professional 
obligations of the president's legal advisors are illustrated by 
the quotations in Part I from the three lawyers who have re- 
cently served as White House Counsel. Gray and Cutler are 
clearly right in one respect. Those who serve in this position 
are government employees, who cannot properly act as person- 
al counsel for their supervisors. In this respect, however, they 
are no different from lawyers retained or employed by institu- 
tional clients in the private sector. There are circumstances in 
which the distinction between the interests of a corporation 
and the personal interests of its principal officers is genuinely 
difficult to draw. And counsel to  a private corporation will 
sometimes be tempted to substitute loyalty to an officer who 
controls the disposition of the firm's legal work for loyalty to 
the firm. Painfbl ethical dilemmas can arise and mistaken 
choices may be made by lawyers in these circumstances just as 
they may in the government. Such problems are inherent in 
the business of representing institutional clients, however, and 
the underlying standard of conduct is the same in the public 
and private sectors: "A lawyer employed or retained by an 
organization represents the organization acting through its 
duly authorized con~tituents."'~ Thus, if Nussbaum undertook 
18. Perhaps the most spectacular recent example of the distortions that can 
result is Lincoln Caplan's The Tenth Justice. LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE 
(1987). This extended attack on President Reagan's second Solicitor General, who is 
supposed to have compromised the "rule of law" by accommodating the President's 
policy goals in briefs to the Supreme Court, is based largely on information and 
accusations provided by anonymous career government lawyers possessed by an 
extraordinarily expansive view of the rights conferred on them by their professional 
status. These accusations, many of which are accepted by Caplan, were manifestly 
motivated by disagreements with Reagan administration policy, rather than by 
allegiance to actual standards of professionalism. For discussions of the biases and 
conceptual mistakes in Caplan's book, see Roger Clegg, The Thirty-Fifth Law Clerk, 
1987 DURE LJ. 964; James Michael Strine, The Office of Legal Counsel: Legal 
Professionals in a Political System 8-14 (1992) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Johns Hopkins University). 
19. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(a) (1992). The 
rule recognizes that, in order to fullill his obligations to the organization, a lawyer 
may sometimes have to refer a matter to the highest authority that can a d  on 
behalf of the organization. Where the highest authority insists upon proceeding in 
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to represent the President or his wife (or both) in their person- 
al capacities while he was on the public payroll, he was acting 
improperly. This judgment does not depend on any peculiar 
ethical tensions created by government service in  general or by 
the special demands of employment in the White House.20 The 
same impropriety would exist if Nussbaum, after returning to 
private practice, were to bill a corporate client for services 
performed in behalf of the personal interests of the client's 
chief executive officer.21 
If it is clear that government employees may not properly 
represent the personal interests of those who hire them, it is 
not nearly so clear exactly what interests they are supposed to 
represent. Gray and Cutler differ on this question, and their 
views represent the two alternatives most frequently presented. 
According to Cutler, the White House Counsel must seek to 
balance the interests of the president as a politician against the 
interests of the office he holds. When these interests diverge, as 
they occasionally must, Cutler suggests that the lawyer must 
decide which is more important in the case a t  hand. Good judg- 
ment-a sensitivity to the competing demands of politics and 
a manner "that is clearly a violation of law and is likely to result in substantial 
injury to the organization, the lawyer may resign." Id. Rule 1.13(c). The ABA's 
comment on Rule 1.13 indicates that government lawyers may operate under addi- 
tional constraints imposed by statute and regulation and that "a different balance 
may be appropriate between maintaining confidentiality and assuring that the 
wrongful official act is prevented or rectified, for public business is involved." Id. 
Rule 1.13 cmt. (1992). This vague and unexceptionable remark is consistent with 
my contention that the basic standard of ethics is the same in the public and 
private sectors. For more detailed discussions of the professional obligations of 
government lawyers, see Catherine J. Lanctot, The Duty of Zealous Advocacy and 
the Ethics of the Federal Government Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 951 (1991) (civil litigation attorneys in Department of Justice); Nelson 
Lund, Rational Choice at  the Office of Legal Counsel, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 437, 
447-52 (1993) (Attorney General); Geoffrey P. Miller, Government Lawlyers' Ethics in 
a System of Checks and Balances, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1293 (1987) (agency lawyers). 
20. There are, of course, special circumstances in which an organization may 
serve its own interests by paying a lawyer to represent the personal interests of 
an individual. Some employers, for example, may agree to provide their employees 
with certain kinds of personal legal services as part of their compensation package, 
in much the same way that they cover certain medical services. Such arrange- 
ments, in which an individual is clearly and properly treated as the lawyer's client, 
are not analogous to cases in which an organization's lawyer substitutes the inter- 
ests of an influential individual for those of the client-organization. 
21. Other questions, which I am not addressing here, are raised by a sepa- 
rate aspect of the incidents that cost Nussbaum his job: White House involvement 
in specifk cases, possibly involving the President or his family, that are being 
handled by independent regulatory agencies. 
THE DEFENSE OF THE PRESIDENCY 
principle, and an ability to resolve concrete dilemmas in a way 
that serves the interests of the nation as a whole---is thus con- 
sidered the hallmark of excellence in a presidential legal advi- 
sor. Cutler's view is neither quirky nor indefensible. It is, for 
example, essentially the view taken by Professor Nancy V. 
Baker in her extended study of the history of the Attorney 
General's office.22 
Gray articulates what seems at first to be a sharply differ- 
ent and more glorified view of the White House lawyer's job: 
that his client is the presidency itself, an entirely abstract 
entity whose needs and interests transcend the desires and 
concerns of any individual who happens to get elected to that 
post. When fully elaborated, this view provides a theoretical 
justification for the ascent, and in many ways the ascendance, 
of government lawyers who specialize in the separation of pow- 
ers. Tracing their intellectual roots to Alexander Hamilton, 
whose theory of the executive gives intellectual respectability 
(and even a certain air of timelessness) to  their endeavors, 
these lawyers present themselves as agents of the Constitution 
itself and guardians of an office whose significance to  our na- 
tion far outstrips the petty political disputes that consume the 
daily life of most of those around the president. Important 
elements of an academic theory supporting Gray's view are pre- 
sented by Terry Eastland, who contends both that the Constitu- 
tion itself largely dictates how presidents should conduct them- 
selves in office and that these constitutional duties are largely 
bound up with defending the prerogatives of his office.23 
What unites the views expressed by Cutler and Gray-and 
in my view unites them in error-is the assumption that mere 
lawyers should be deciding how the president ought to accom- 
modate his political and policy agenda with the obligations he 
has to  the office he occupies. Like clients in private practice, 
the president is responsible for his own decisions, and in fact 
he has the authority either to  make his own legal determina- 
tions without consulting any of his lawyers or to  proceed in the 
face of contrary advice from any lawyer he does consult.24 It is 
22. NANCY V. BAKER, CONFLICTING LOYALTIES: LAW AND POLPTICS IN THE AT- 
TORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE (1992). 
23. TERRY EASZZAND, ENERGY IN THE EXECUTIVE (1992). 
24. Presidents have been quite willing to exercise this right. See, e .g ,  GRIFFIN 
B. BELL & RONALD J. OWROW, TAKING CARE OF THE LAW 24-28 (1982) (discussing 
President Carter's decision to ignore a Justice Department opinion objecting, on 
constitutional grounds, to a proposal that public funds be used to pay the salaries 
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true that the president has legal obligations that differ from 
those of any private citizen, or indeed from any other govern- 
ment official. But they are his obligations, not those of his 
lawyers or  subordinate^.^^ If, for example, the president de- 
cides that his political and policy agenda is more important t o  
the future of the country than defending his office from consti- 
tutionally dubious legislative restrictions, no lawyer anywhere 
in the government has the authority to displace that determi- 
nation. Like anyone else, his lawyers may argue that a particu- 
lar judgment by the president is mistaken, and they may some- 
times be right. But when lawyers assume to substitute their 
own judgment for the president's-as they must if "the Oval 
Office" (Gray) or the "office of the presidency" (Cutler) is their 
client-they are acting without legal warrant. 
Though the president's lawyers have no legal right to sub- 
stitute the presidency for the president as their client, they 
have the right t o  negotiate with the president for the privilege 
of making such a substitution. Lloyd Cutler may have done just 
that, for it appeared when he was appointed that President 
Clinton needed his services far more than Cutler wanted the 
job.26 But even apart from such special circumstances, there 
of certain persons working in church schools); Robert H. Jackson, A Presidential 
Legal Opinion, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1353 (1953) (discussing President Franklin 
Roosevelt's rejection of his Attorney General's suggestion that legislative vetoes are 
permissible under the Constitution). Similarly, presidents feel free to overrule Jus- 
tice Department legal determinations with which they disagree. See, e.g., Paul M. 
Barrett, Clinton Orders Justice Agency To Withdraw Brief, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 
1994 (reporting that Department of Justice withdrew previously fded appellate brief 
in bankruptcy case, and quoting the Department as saying: "The President has 
concluded that [the DOJ brief] adopted a narrower view of the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act than his understanding of the meaning of the new statute."); Linda 
Greenhouse, Bush Reverses U.S. Stance Against Black College Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
22, 1991, at B6 (reporting that President Bush ordered Department of Justice to 
file a Supreme Court brief contradicting constitutional interpretation advocated in 
preceding brief). 
25. Unlike other state and federal officers, who must commit that they will 
"support" the Constitution, the president is constitutionally required to take a 
unique oath pledging that Y . . . will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect 
and defend" the Constitution. Compare U.S. CONST. art. VI with id. art. 11, $ 1. 
Although the president's oath implies that he has a special obligation to the Con- 
stitution that goes beyond the obligations of other government officials, it does not 
authorize any of those officials-be they lawyers, judges, or ethics specialists-to 
dictate how he should meet that obligation. The only legal method for enforcing 
the president's oath is through impeachment proceedings. 
26. Cutler, who had served previously as President Carter's White House 
Counsel, was apparently unwilling to give President Clinton at least one commit- 
ment that the President wanted. During the press conference at which the Pres- 
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are persistent forces encouraging presidents to allow their 
closest legal advisors to view themselves as counsel for the 
presidency. If those forces were to produce a settled expectation 
that the president should be treated by his chief legal advisors 
merely as a kind of caretaker for the institution of the pres- 
idency, to which they owe their true allegiance, it might not 
much matter whether there is a legal basis upon which the 
president's lawyers could rely in presuming to  set themselves 
up as judges of his fidelity to  his constitutional oath of office. 
Such an arrangement might even be thought to  benefit presi- 
dents more than their lawyers, since it is after all the president 
who gets to  employ the authority that the lawyers would be 
dedicated to defending and expanding. 
The Bush administration provides a useful case study 
through which to explore the tensions between advising a pres- 
ident and advising the presidency. When George Bush was 
elected president, a variety of factors had established a pattern 
of conflicts in which unsettled constitutional issues involving 
the separation of powers provided the terms of debate for a 
struggle over control of the basic mechanisms of governance. In 
addition to the continuing repercussions of the Watergate scan- 
dals and the 1974 elections, these factors included both the 
seemingly fixed disinclination of the voters to establish either 
political party in command of both the legislative and executive 
departments of government and the fresh tensions generated 
by the Iran-Contra affair. Coming into office without a well- 
articulated substantive agenda, but with a strong sense of the 
disorder that can arise from congressional attempts to exercise 
naturally executive functions, President Bush took what must 
be the unique or very unusual step of directing that a legal 
strategy be developed for enhancing the defense of his office. 
The record of this effort to  close the gap between constitutional 
principle and administration policy can help illuminate both 
the possibilities open to presidential legal advisors and the 
limits on their role in government. 
ident a~ounced his appointment, Cutler said: "I am a senior citizen, you can see, 
and from direct experience, I know the intensity and the rigors of this job. And I 
have, therefore, limited my commitment with the President's permission-I had to 
negotiate hard for it-to a period of months." Remarks Announcing the Appoint- 
ment of Lloyd Cutler as Special Counsel to the President and an Exchange With 
Reporters, 30 WRLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 462 (March 8, 1994). 
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B. The Existing Literature and an Alternative Approach 
A close study of the Bush administration's record on sepa- 
ration of powers issues also offers an opportunity to supple- 
ment a growing body of scholarship dealing with the behavior 
of legal bureaucracies. This scholarship, which has been pro- 
duced mainly by political scientists, attempts to explain the 
behavior of lawyers in government in terms of a variety of 
personal, institutional, and historical forces. Professor Nancy V. 
Baker, for example, focuses on individual Attorneys General 
and seeks to explain their performance in office according to 
whether they behaved more as a neutral law officer or as the 
president's advocate and supporter.27 Professor James Michael 
Strine's detailed study of OLC concludes that both continuity 
and change within that office can be explained by its institu- 
tional structures, norms, roles, and rules." Professor Cornell 
W. Clayton emphasizes the impact on legal policy-making at 
the Justice Department of wider historical and political forces 
such as the nationalization of governmental power, the 
judicialization of large areas of public policy, and the institu- 
tionalization of partisan conflict.2s 
The information included in these studies can explain a 
great deal, for government lawyers operate in environments 
that are severely constrained by a variety of factors including 
the norms and expectations of the legal profession, the balance 
of power that obtains among various political factions in and 
out of government a t  any given time, and the sheer growth in  
the size and complexity of the federal administrative state. In  
my view, however, the existing literature does not adequately 
explain the operation of these factors because it gives insuffi- 
cient attention to the way in which incentive structures affect 
the choices made by individual lawyers and those with whom 
they deal. 
The absence of serious inquiry into the incentives that 
affect individual choice in legal bureaucracies appears to result 
in  part from constraints that the subject matter places on those 
who undertake these studies. First, the most accessible sources 
of information about the way legal bureaucracies operate are 
the memoirs of those who have served in high positions in the 
27. BAKER, supra note 22. 
28. Strine, supra note 18, at 1, 318. 
29. CORNELL W. CLAYTON, THE POLITICS OF JUSIICE: THE A m m  GENERAL 
AND THE MAKING OF LEGAL POLICY (1992). 
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government. Such memoirs are unreliable because their au- 
thors face an extremely strong temptation to understate the 
degree to which they engaged in self-serving or mistaken be- 
havior while in office. When researchers try to supplement 
such sources through interviews with more obscure officials, 
their research cannot escape the underlying problem. Many 
government lawyers take the confidentiality of their work seri- 
ously, and are therefore reluctant to speak in useful detail 
about what they and others in the government do. Those who 
do choose to  speak with researchers, especially when they 
speak anonymously, cannot be assumed either to  constitute a 
fair sample or to be unbiased reporters. On the contrary, it 
would be safer to suppose that many who are willing to provide 
information to outsiders do so because they have an axe to 
grind.30 
Documentary evidence in legal archives will rarely be able 
to provide much assistance in correcting the problems described 
above. The documents that underlie the legal advice presidents 
receive are seldom available to researchers until after the deci- 
sions to  which they relate are long past, and they often never 
become a~a i lab le .~~  Much advice, moreover, is formulated in 
meetings and discussions that are never recorded, among peo- 
ple who will never have a reason to offer complete, or complete- 
ly candid, accounts of what was said. 
These limitations can to some extent be overcome through 
sufficient study of the public record, which contains a great 
deal of information about what presidents and their lawyers 
actually do, and about their efforts to explain publicly what 
they do. Not only does the public record contain a great deal of 
information, but it has the very important advantage that re- 
search based on it can be checked by anyone who wants to 
verify the claims made by those who rely on it. Unfortunately, 
the public record has not been thoroughly scrutinized in the 
existing literature, and for very understandable reasons. Light 
reading it is not, and much of it can be confusing to those who 
are unfaTMiliar with the specific bodies of law out of which par- 
30. For an example of a study in which this supposition was not adopted, see 
CAM, supra note 18. 
31. Cf., e.g., John 0. McGi~is ,  Models of the Opinion Function of the Attor- 
ney General: A Normative, Descriptive, and Historical Prolegomenon, 15 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 375, 376 (1993) (reporting that OLC library fdes contain many unpublished 
opinions). 
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ticular legal issues arise. And yet, one cannot meaningfully 
evaluate what happens when the president is given legal advice 
on important issues unless one can evaluate the strengths and 
weaknesses of the legal arguments involved. Without such an 
evaluation, one is not likely to understand the relationship 
between the legal and the extra-legal components of the advice, 
or the real causes of any ensuing decisions. 
The Afterword to this article gives examples of the Micul- 
ties that can arise from insufficient skepticism about informa- 
tion from sources within legal bureaucracies and from insuffti- 
cient familiarity with the law with which these bureaucracies 
deal. These difficulties can be especially serious when academic 
analysts are intent on formulating lessons that they wish t o  
urge on policy-makers, as most students of this subject have 
been. Professor Clayton, for example, is extremely harsh in 
criticizing what he considers the "politicization" of the Justice 
Department under Presidents Reagan and Bush, and he con- 
cludes that serious consideration should be given to removing 
that Department from the president's control.32 Professor 
Jeremy Rabkin, conversely, reviews most of what little is 
known about the history of the Office of the Counsel to  the 
President, and concludes by attacking the Clinton administra- 
tion for relying i n ~ ~ c i e n t l y  on the institutional wisdom of the 
Justice Department.33 
Such recommendations, however, can hardly be distin- 
guished from political advice unless they are grounded in ade- 
quate explanatory models. The models employed in the litera- 
ture, however, are ill-defined, and the scholarship in this area 
is very short on testable predictions. Indeed, one rarely sees 
any analysis that gets much beyond such self-evident points as 
the following: when the executive and legislative departments 
are controlled by different political parties, conflicts over sepa- 
ration of powers i n~ rease ;~  increasing conflicts between the 
executive and the legislature tend to increase the involvement 
of the judiciary in issues involving the control of governmental 
 institution^;^^ executive officials have less success in pursuing 
aggressive agendas if their private financial dealings create op- 
32. CLAYTON, supra note 29, at 236. 
33. Rabkin, supra note 9, at 95-97. 
34. CLAYTON, supra note 29, at 7. 
35. Id. 
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portunities for their adversaries to attack their ethicsf6 and 
legal advisors who do not champion the president's agenda lose 
influence with the president while those who do champion his 
agenda invite attacks from the president's political adversar- 
i e ~ . ~ '  
I have tried to overcome some of the limitations in the 
existing literature. First, I employ a simple and fairly well 
defined model of human behavior, drawn from the science of 
economics, which has proven useful in explaining a wide range 
of human conduct. I assume, as a hypothesis, that the 
president's legal advisors and the other people with whom they 
deal in their professional lives behave as rational utility maxi- 
mizers in an environment characterized by limited resources. 
This model implies, most importantly for present purposes, 
that people cannot have as much as they want of the most 
obvious things they desire-such as money, prestige, power, 
and leisure-and that they will respond to changes in their 
environment by changing their own behavior in an effort to 
maximize their self-interest. Using this model does not require 
one to assume that truly disinterested, or even self-sacrificing, 
behavior never occurs. Nor need one assume that acts of insan- 
ity or irrational zealotry never occur. The approach adopted 
here simply makes the provisional assumption that such con- 
duct is rare enough in certain contexts (in this case, the busi- 
ness of government during the late twentieth century in the 
United States) that events will largely proceed as if self-sacri- 
ficing or irrational behavior were none~istent.~' 
Use of the rational-choice model seems particularly suit- 
able in examining the behavior of people operating in a system 
that was consciously designed to promote an identity (though 
necessarily an imperfect one) between duty and interest.3g An- 
36. BAKER, mpra note 22, at  100. 
37. Id. at 172, 175-76. 
38. Thus, I emphatically do not contend or assume that human behavior 
generally, or the behavior considered in this article, can be fully understood 
through the application of rational-choice analysis alone. Such claims have been co- 
gently criticized. See, e-g., Herbert J. Storing, The Science of Administration: Her- 
bert A. Simon, in ESSAYS ON THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF POLITICS (Herbert J. 
Storing ed., 1962); cf. Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? 
(The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (1993) (applying 
a rational-choice model to "ordinary" life-tenured judges but leaving open the possi- 
bility that the behavior of judicial "titans," "Prometheans," or "genius-saints" would 
require a more complex analysis). 
39. This theme recurs throughout the Federalist Papers, but the best known 
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other reason for regarding this model as especially useN in 
the present context is that it helps direct attention to impor- 
tant causal influences that those who create the public record 
on which we must rely have a motive to conceal, even from 
themselves. People who serve in public office are both expected 
and inclined to explain their own behavior by reference to  the 
"public interest" or "the law" or "the Constitution," rather than 
in terms of their self-interest. Abandoning this expectation and 
discouraging these inclinations would not elevate public dis- 
course or improve the operation of government. But neither can 
it advance the understanding of government to accept such 
protestations of disinterestedness, at least without critical 
examination. Government lawyers, in particular, may be less 
driven by self-interest than those who compete with other peo- 
ple in the worlds of business or electoral politics, but such a 
happy fact is one that would need to be proved rather than 
assumed. 
One of the more obvious dangers in the use of a rational- 
choice model, of course, is that one will be tempted simply to  
discount appeals to standards such as "the law" or "the Consti- 
tution" as so much self-serving camouflage, without giving 
sufficient attention t o  the fact that people can include fidelity 
to the law in their own utility functions.40 The law and legal 
principles, like the dictates of loyalty and justice, can and do 
operate as meaningful constraints on lawyers' behavior even 
formulation is probably the following: 
Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man 
must be co~ec ted  with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a 
reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to 
control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the 
greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no gov- 
ernment would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither exter- 
nal nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a 
government which is to be administered by men over men, the great 
dficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the 
governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence 
on the people is, no doubt the primary control on the government; but 
experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions. 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
40. Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 77, at  458 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The supposition of universal venality in human nature is little 
less an error in political reasoning than the supposition of universal rectitude."). 
Venality, of course, is not the same as self-interest, but Hamilton's criticism of 
inverse sentimentality is an apt warning to anyone who employs economic analysis 
in the study of politics. 
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though this surely happens less often than lawyers say it does 
when they are explaining their own actions. I have tried to 
avoid the pitfall of unjustified cynicism by examining the 
strengths and weaknesses of the legal arguments offered by the 
individuals whose conduct is being considered, and by compar- 
ing what they actually did with the explanations they offered 
for what they did. 
The rational-choice model of human behavior generates a 
simple but somewhat counter-intuitive prediction about the 
subject-matter of this article: a president should prove unsuc- 
cessful if he attempts to m k e  the defense of the presidency an 
important element of his administration's agenda. The rewards 
for a consistent and forceful defense of the legal interests of the 
office of the presidency would be largely abstract, since they 
would consist primarily of fidelity to a certain theory of the 
Constitution. To the extent that the rewards could be translat- 
ed into actual increased power to accomplish policy and politi- 
cal goals, those rewards would mostly be reaped at  some re- 
mote period of time, after the defenders of the theory had left 
office. The costs of pursuing a serious defense of the presidency, 
however, would tend to be immediate and tangible. These costs 
would include the expenditure of political capital that might 
have been used for more pressing purposes, the unpleasantness 
of increased friction with congressional barons and their allies, 
and the sheer expenditure of time by extremely busy people on 
uninvitingly dry legal issues. 
Presidential lawyers who specialize in the separation of 
powers would tend to collect a large share of the benefits in the 
form of increased glory and increased job satisfaction, but the 
specialization of functions that produces this result also means 
that the costs would largely be borne by others in the govern- 
ment, above all by the president. Therefore, when the costs to 
the president (and to those of his advisors with a broader re- 
sponsibility for governance than that allocated to  separation-of- 
powers lawyers) become siWcant, we should expect the 
lawyers' legal principles to  be compromised or abandoned. And 
because the costs of adhering to  those principles tend to  be 
highest in the most important cases, we should expect to  find a 
pattern in which the principles are adhered to only primarily in 
relatively trivial cases. The following sections of this article are 
devoted to testing these predictions. 
The approach sketched here necessarily requires a level of 
analysis that is more detailed than one ordinarily fmds in stud- 
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ies of the operation of legal bureaucracies. I have therefore 
limited the study in two dimensions. First, only issues involv- 
ing the separation of powers are considered. Second, the analy- 
sis is confined almost exclusively to George Bush's four years in  
In 1987, Vice President Bush was introduced at a meeting 
of a group of conservative lawyers by C. Boyden Gray, who had 
served as his Counsellor throughout the Reagan administra- 
tion. The Vice President then delivered a speech arguing that 
congressional "micromanagement" of foreign policy was an 
improper substitution of the legislature's properly political 
oversight responsibilities with an  unduly legalistic "regulatory" 
regime. Bush believed both that this was a serious practical 
problem because it threatened to "destroy our government's 
ability to function effectively," and that its amelioration re- 
quired practical steps to establish relationships of trust be- 
tween officials in the executive and legislative departments of 
government. Significantly, however, Bush contended that these 
practical steps should be taken in the context of a reexamina- 
tion of the intent of the Framers of the Constitution and the 
"objective principles embodied in the law" they created.42 
After becoming president, one of Bush's very first public 
statements dealt with this same issue: "I am concerned about 
the erosion of presidential power, particularly in the fields of 
national defense and foreign policy, but I want to work with 
Congress," Bush said. "If they want in on the take-off, fine. I've 
got to make the decision. I have constitutional responsibilities 
and they have theirs, largely in the purse  string^.'"^ The Pres- 
41. Similarly, detailed studies may usefully be made of other issue clusters 
and of other eras. One corollary of the argument presented in this article, for ex- 
ample, is that we should expect to find that significant expansions of presidential 
power, and serious resistance to congressional efforts to restrict that power, might 
sometimes occur, but almost always as a by-product of presidents' efforts to accom- 
plish other substantive objectives. This proposition should be tested against the 
historical record, but that project is beyond the scope of this article. 
42. George Bush, m e  Interaction of the Legislative, Judicial, and Executive 
Branches in the Making of Foreign Policy, 11 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POLZY 1, 1-3 
(1988). 
43. Bush Pledges to Work with Congress but Warns of Firm Hand, UPI, Jan. 
21, 1989. See also Robert Shogan, Bush's Dilemma in Dealing with a Contrary 
Hill, L.A. T ~ s ,  April 16, 1989, pt. 5, at  3, col. 2 ("As he struggled last year for 
the GOP presidential nomination, Bush bitterly complained about the 'chaos' pro- 
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ident also moved quickly to establish a special team of lawyers 
to  devise legal strategies for carrying out his interests in these 
matters." The ranking members of this group were C. Boyden 
Gray and William P. Barr, the Assistant Attorney General for 
OLC, who was offen described as Gray's prot~g6.~' Barr's rep- 
utation at OLC came to rest largely on his aggressive defense 
of presidential authority;'6 and he enjoyed a meteoric rise 
from almost complete obscurity to the office of Attorney Gener- 
al. 
Defense of the constitutional authorities of the presidency 
continued to receive considerable attention throughout Bush's 
presidency. In a major address on the Constitution midway 
through his term, for example, the President talked mainly 
about relations between the president and Congress. In this 
address, he claimed that he had possessed the "inherent power7' 
to  use the armed forces in the Gulf War without congressional 
authorization; he said that when Congress takes aggressive 
legislative action against specific presidential powers, "the 
President has a constitutional obligation to  protect his Office 
and to veto the legislation"; and he boasted of having said on 
many occasions "that statutory provisions that violate the Con- 
stitution have no binding legal force.'"' At the very end of his 
term, moreover, President Bush engaged in an unusually direct 
and personal effort to assert authority over a federal agency 
duced by congressional 'micromanagement' of foreign policy. You got 535 secretar- 
ies of state up there,' he declared. The world outside observes and loses faith.'"); 
Gerald F. Seib, Bush Will Attempt to Trim Powers of Congress, Particularly on 
National-Security Policy Issues, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 1989. 
44. See R.W. Apple, A Balance of Bush7 The Congress and the Contras, N.Y. 
TIMES, April 2, 1989, $ 4, at 1, col. 1 ("[Tlwo weeks ago [Bush] and a group of key 
aides decided to create a working group to combat what they termed 'the erosion 
of Presidential authority'. "). 
45. Many sources treat B a d s  relationship with Gray. See, e.g., Sharon 
LaFraniere, Burr Takes Center Stage a t  Justice Department With New Script, 
WASH. POST, March 5, 1992, at  A19; Phil McCombs, Counsel's Last Hurrah: The 
Final Furious Days of C. Boyden Gray, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 1993, a t  GI; Michael 
Wines, A Counsel With Sway Over Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1991, at  A16, col. 
1. 
46. See e.g., David Johnston, Washington a t  Work; Political Lifeguard at  the 
Justice Dept., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1990, at  B8, col. 1; Daniel Klaidman, Burr 
Takes Hard Line On Executive Power; Senate Mulls AG Nominee's Record, LEGAL 
TIMES, Nov. 11, 1991, at 1; Sharon LaFraniere, For Nominee Barr, an Unusual 
Path to Attorney General's Office, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 1991, at A6. 
47. Remarks a t  Dedication Ceremony of the Social Science Complex a t  
Princeton University in Princeton, New Jersey, 27 WKLY. COW. PRES. DOC. 589, 
590-91 (May 10, 1991). 
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(the U.S. Postal Service) that Congress had sought to  insulate 
from the president's control.48 
This very high-level interest in shoring up the legal de- 
fense of the presidency distinguished the Bush administration 
from its predecessor. President Reagan's first Attorney General, 
in a rare criticism of the president he served, wrote in his 
memoirs: 
If there was one area in which the White House was deficient 
during my years in office, it was in the protection of 
presidential power. Decisions there were made on the basis of 
the substance of individual issues. There was no effective 
concern or review of the impact that issue or the position 
taken with respect to  i t  would have on presidential power. 
Nor was there any effort to identify governmental activities 
elsewhere that, if developed, would adversely affect the prov- 
ince of the executive. Nor, to be candid, was the bully pulpit 
used t o  provide leadership or defense of that vital institu- 
t i ~ n . ~ '  
This is not to say that the Reagan administration ignored the 
separation of powers or that it was unwilling to act in defense 
of the presidency." Indeed, Reagan's constitutional law- 
yers-primarily those at OLC-had worked out a detailed juris- 
prudence that was scarcely revised or supplemented during the 
Bush years.51 Bush's new initiative may be viewed merely as 
48. See infia part V. 
49. WILLIAM FRENCH SMITH, LAW AND JUSTICE IN THE REAGAN ADMINISTRA- 
TION 222 (1991). The Meese Justice Department was somewhat more aggressive 
than its predecessor on separation-of-powers issues, and the pattern of White 
House behavior described by Smith may have changed somewhat as a result of the 
particularly close relationship between Reagan and Meese. What seems to set the 
Bush administration apart is the personal interest that the President himself took 
in the concerns that Smith identified in the passage quoted above. 
50. Nor is this to say that the separation of powers and the defense of presi- 
dential prerogatives had been insignificant prior to the Reagan-Bush years. Demo- 
cratic and Republican administrations alike, for example, had consistently objected 
on constitutional grounds to legislative vetoes and to certain provisions of the War 
Powers Resolution. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (a case in which both 
the Carter and Reagan administrations challenged a legislative veto); John W. 
Rolph, The Decline and Fall of the War Powers Resolution, ' 40 NAVAL . REV. 85 
(1992); Strine, supra note 18, at 195-206. 
51. OLC began contributing heavily to the legalization of separation-of-powers 
disputes at least as early as the Carter administration. Strine, supra note 18, at 
195-206. During the Reagan administration, however, the importance of OLC's role 
seems to have increased. Cf. Miller, supra note 13, at 410-12 (recounting the ag- 
gressive resurgence of the presidency under Reagan as compared to his predeces- 
sors). 
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an elevation of the Reagan administration's jurisprudence t o  
the status of administration policy. Or, one could say, Bush 
was endorsing the concerns and goals of OLC in a way that 
would allow the body of legal principles developed in that office 
t o  be given a fair test outside the rarefied and insular atmo- 
sphere of OLC itself. If we want some idea of what can happen 
when a president allows, and even encourages, his leading law- 
yers to  devote themselves to the interests of the presidency 
itself, the Bush administration offers an almost perfect case 
study. 
I have argued elsewhere that OLC faces a set of con- 
straints and incentives that prevent it from developing an insti- 
tutional mission of the kind that is often observed in govern- 
ment bureaucracies, including such legal bureaucracies as the 
Office of the Solicitor General.52 It is even more obvious that 
the White House Counsel's office-which is completely reconsti- 
tuted with each new administration and which each president 
is free to shape in whatever way he sees fit-cannot be as- 
sumed to be driven by a stable institutional or bureaucratic 
culture. It is nonetheless possible that some "missions" are so 
inherently appropriate or attractive to presidential legal advi- 
sors that they will be adopted with a kind of inevitability that 
does not depend on the operation of bureaucratic imperatives of 
the usual kind. For OLC, the defense of the presidency seems 
to  be an obvious candidate for such a mission, and separation 
of powers does seem to be regarded as the soul of that office's 
For those who serve in the office of the White House 
Counsel, moreover, adopting the mission of defending the presi- 
dency would seem t o  offer them a way of taking the edge off 
their slightly unsavory reputation for politically driven lawyer- 
ing.= The Bush administration should therefore show us what 
can happen when lawyers with a commitment to  the separation 
52. Nelson Lund, Rational Choice at  the W i e  of Legal Counsel, 15 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 437 (1993). 
53. This is illustrated in two recent articles written by OLC alumni: Douglas 
W. Kmiec, O E s  Opinion Writing Function: The Legal Adhesive for a Unitary Exec- 
utive, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 337 (1993); McGinnis, supra note 31, at  432-35. Profes- 
sor Kmiec's article discusses seven major examples of OLC's work, six of which are 
analyzed primarily as problems in defining the scope of the president's authority. 
Similarly, Professor McGinnis's only extended discussion of OLC's substantive legal 
analysis involves that office's effort to  make a silk purse out of the earful that the 
Supreme Court gave the executive in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
54. See, e.g., PATTERSON, supra note 9, at  141; Strine, supra note 18, at  117- 
18 & n.35. 
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of powers are elevated, or get themselves elevated, to the role 
of serious policy players. 
The record of the Bush administration also provides an 
opportunity to test an  important hypothesis derived from game 
theory. As Professor John 0. McGinnis has pointed out, the 
actual practice of separation of powers can be described 
through "a model in which governmental powers are often 
distributed [not by the formal rules set out in the Constitution, 
but] by the branches themselves through bargains and accom- 
modations that maximize their respective  interest^."^^ One 
corollary of this model seems to be that the president should be 
able to strengthen his bargaining position through a "pre-com- 
mitment strategy": by committing his prestige to the defense of 
a set of publicly articulated principles, the president can 
strengthen his own hand in  h tu re  negotiations because every- 
one will know that departures from those principles will be 
more costly to the president than they would be if his prestige 
were not already c ~ m m i t t e d . ~ ~  Under this view, President 
Bush's visible elevation of the role played by his constitutional 
lawyers could be seen as serving the president's interests at 
least as much as it served those lawyers' interests: 'By articu- 
lating the principles that the executive will not concede, OLC 
generates commitments for the h tu re  that may strengthen the 
president's bargaining position vis-a-vis the other branches."57 
If this plausible suggestion about the usefulness of "pre-corn- 
mitment strategies" helps explain the development of the sepa- 
ration of powers, we should expect to observe significantly more 
resolute and uncompromising behavior by the Bush administra- 
tion than by the Reagan administration. The theory and evi- 
dence presented in this article, however, suggests that other 
incentives operating on the president and his advisors render a 
pre-commitment strategy untenable. 
A. Implementation of the Legal Strategy: Veto Messages and 
Signing Statements 
President Bush's interest in promoting a coherent and 
forceful legal strategy for defending the presidency had observ- 
55. John 0. McGinnis, Constitutional Review by the Executive in Foreign Af- 
fairs and War Powers: A Consequence of Rational Choice in the Separation of Pow- 
ers, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1993, at 293, 294. 
56. See d. at 313-14 & n.106. 
57. Id. at 314. 
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able effects. Perhaps the most visible results of the initiative 
emerged in his veto messages and in the signing statements he 
issued when approving new legislation. The President vetoed 
forty-six bills, citing constitutional objections in at least eleven 
instances. In  five of these eleven cases, the bills would have 
been vetoed for independent policy reasons, and might well not 
have been vetoed on constitutional grounds alone? In two of 
the eleven cases, however, the principal grounds for the 
President's objection to the bill were constitutional in na- 
ture:' and in four other cases constitutional objections were 
the only apparent reason for his veto?' Remarkably, every 
58. See Message to the Senate Returning Without Approval the Cable Tele- 
vision Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 28 WKLY. COMP. PREs. 
DOC. 1860 (Od. 3, 1992) (stating First Amendment objections but giving greater 
emphasis to concerns that the bill would increase consumer costs); Message to the 
Senate Returning Without Approval the National Voter Registration Act of 1992, 
28 W a y .  COMP. PREs. DOC. 1201 (July 2, 1992) (mentioning constitutional doubts 
about the existence of congressional authority to supplant state regulation of elec- 
tions while emphasizing the problems that the bill might create); Message to the 
House of Representatives Returning Without Approval the National Institute of 
Health Revitalization Amendments of 1992, 28 WKLY. Corn. PRES. DOC. 1132 
(June 23, 1992) (emphasizing ethical, fiscal, administrative, and philosophical 
grounds for objections as well as concerns relating to the Appointments Clause and 
to interference with the president's authority to supervise his subordinates); Mes- 
sage to the Senate Returning Without Approval the Congressional Campaign 
Spending Limit and Election Reform Act of 1992, 28 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 822 
(May 9, 1992) (noting concerns with corruption and incumbency advantage as well 
as First Amendment objections); Message to the House of Representatives Return- 
ing Without Approval the Textile, Apparel, and Footwear Trade Ad of 1990, 26 
WRLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 1531 (Oct. 5, 1990) (noting adverse impact on consumers 
as well as interference with president's discretion in foreign affairs and with 
president's discretion under Recommendation Clause). 
59. See Message to the House of Representatives Returning Without Approval 
the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations 
Act, 1990, 25 WKLY. COMP. PREs. DOC. 1783 (Nov. 19, 1989) (interference with 
president's discretion in foreign affairs); Message to the Senate Returning Without 
Approval the Bill Prohibiting the Export of Technology, Defense Articles, and De- 
fense Services to Codevelop or Produce FS-X Aircraft With Japan, 25 WKLY. COMP. 
PRES. DOC. 1191 (July 31, 1989) (interference with president's discretion in foreign 
affairs and with president's authority to supervise his subordinates). 
60. See Memorandum of Disapproval for the Morris K. Udall Scholarship and 
Excellence in National Environmental Policy Act, 27 WKLY. COW. PRES. DOC. 1877 
@ec. 20, 1991) (Appointments Clause objection); Memorandum of Disapproval for 
the Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991, 26 WKLY. COMP. PREs. DOC. 
1958 (Nov. 30, 1990) (interference with president's discretion in foreign affairs); 
Memorandum of Disapproval for the Omnibus Export Amendments Act of 1990, 26 
WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 1839 (Nov. 16, 1990) (interference with president's dis- 
cretion in foreign affairs); Message to the House of Representatives Returning 
Without Approval the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 
1991, 25 WKLY. COW. PREs. DOC. 1806 (Nov. 21, 1989) (interference with 
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veto that was based solely or primarily on constitutional 
grounds involved a claimed invasion of the constitutional au- 
thority of the president's office, while at least two other bills 
that the President deemed unconstitutional (although not a 
threat to his office) were allowed to become law.61 President 
Reagan, by way of contrast, seemed never to  have vetoed a bill 
on the ground that it infringed on the president's authority,6' 
although he sometimes included objections to  such infringe- 
ments in messages dealing with vetoes that were based primar- 
ily on policy grounds.63 Reagan, however, did veto at least two 
bills on constitutional grounds unrelated to  presidential author- 
ity, including one that simply codified a regulation that the Su- 
preme Court had previously upheld.64 Reagan frequently ap- 
president's discretion in foreign affairs). 
61. See Statement on the Children's Television Act of 1990, 26 Way.  COMP. 
PREs. DOC. 1611 (Od. 17, 1990) (First Amendment); Statement on the Flag Pro- 
tection Act of 1989, 25 WKLY. COMP. PREs. DOC. 1619 (Oct. 26, 1989) (First 
Amendment). In both cases, it should be noted, Bush allowed the bills to become 
law, but withheld his approval. Despite Bush's refusal to approve the flag bill, 
however, his Department of Justice enforced it and defended its constitutionality in 
court. See Brief for the United States, United States v. Eichman, 496 US. 310 
(1990) (NOS. 89-1433, 89-1434). 
62. Professor Douglas W. Kmiec seems to imply, contrary to my claim, that 
the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1988 was vetoed on constitutional grounds. 
Kmiec, supra note 53, at 343. The President's statement explaining his veto, how- 
ever, indicates that his principal objection to the bill was that it would have en- 
abled "employees who are not genuine whistleblowers [to] manipulate the process 
to their advantage simply to delay or avoid appropriate adverse personnel actions." 
The President also discussed certain "serious constitutional concerns," but he went 
no further than to say that these provisions "could not have been implementedn to 
the extent they were inconsistent with the Constitution. Memorandum of Disap- 
proval for the Whistleblower Protection Ad of 1988, 24 WKLY. COMP. PREs. DOC. 
1377 (Oct. 26, 1988). 
On at least two occasions, President Reagan vetoed bills that contained pro- 
visions to which he objected because they improperly permitted entities other than 
the Congress to exercise legislative functions. See Memorandum of Disapproval of 
S. 2166 (Indian Health Care Legislation), 20 WKLY. COW. PREs. DOC. 1583 (Od. 
19, 1984); Message to the House of Representatives Returning H.J. Res. 338 (De- 
segregation h n d s  for the Chicago Board of Education) Without Approval, 19 
WRLY. COMP. PREs. DOC. 1133 (Aug. 13, 1983). This may or may not have reflect- 
ed a principled concern with the separation of powers, but it does not imply a 
vigorous defense of the presidency. 
63. See, e.g., Message to the House of Representatives Returning H.R. 4868 
Without Approval, 22 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 1281, 1282 (Sep. 26, 1986); Memo- 
randum of Disapproval of H.R. 7336, 19 WKLY. COMP. PREs. DOC. 38 (Jan. 12, 
1983); Memorandum of Disapproval of S. 2623, 19 WHLY. COMP. PREs. DOC. 7 (Jan. 
3, 1983). 
64. See Memorandum of Disapproval for the Children's Television Act of 1988, 
24 WKLY. COW. PRES. DOC. 1456 (Nov. 5, 1988) (First Amendment objections); 
Message to the Senate Returning S. 742 Without Approval, 23 WKLY. COW. PRES. 
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proved bills containing constitutionally dubious restrictions on 
his a u t h ~ r i t y , ~ ~  and he signed into law at least four bills that 
his administration later challenged in the courts as violations 
of the president's constitutional powers? 
A pattern similar to  that found in Bush's veto messages 
can be found in his signing statements. Unlike the President's 
veto messages, which are required by the Constitution, the 
statements that presidents sometimes issue when they approve 
new legislation are completely discretionary. Many presidents 
have issued such statements from time to time, but serious 
efforts to use them as a tool for advancing a coherent legal 
strategy began only in the Reagan administration." Signing 
statements can serve as such a tool in three principal ways: by 
interpreting ambiguous statutory language in a manner that 
the president hopes will be treated by the courts as a legiti- 
mate form of legislative history;68 by instructing the 
president's subordinates in the executive agencies to resolve 
Doc. 715 (June 19, 1987) (First Amendment objections). S. 742 would have codified 
the so-called "fairness doctrine," which had been promulgated as a regulation by 
the FCC and then sustained against a constitutional challenge in Red Lion Broad- 
casting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). President Reagan's veto message recog- 
nized the holding in Red Lion, but openly disputed it. The President concluded: "S. 
742 simply c a ~ o t  be reconciled with the freedom of speech and the press secured 
by our Constitution. It is, in my judgment, unconstitutional." 23 WKLY. COMP. 
PREs. DOC. a t  716. 
65. See, e.g., Statement on Signing a Bill on Veterans' Benefits, 24 Way. 
COMP. PREs. DOC. 1548 (Nov. 18, 1988); Statement on Signing S. 1874 Into Law, 
22 W ~ Y .  COMP. PREs. DOC. 1045 (Aug. 4, 1986); Remarks on Signing S. 2603 Into 
Law, 20 WKLY. COMP. PREs. DOC. 1476, 1476-77 (Oct. 9, 1984); Statement on Sign- 
ing H.R. 5712 Into Law, 20 WKLY. COMP. PREs. DOC. 1201, 1201-02 (Aug. 30, 
1984); Statement on Signing H.R. 3222 Into Law, 19 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 
1619 (Nov. 28, 1983). 
66. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (independent counsel statute); 
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (statute that assigned an agent of Congress 
authority to determine cuts in the federal budget); Ameron, Inc. v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Eng%s, 809 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1986) (statute assigning a role in govern- 
ment procurement to an agent of Congress), cert. dismissed, 488 U.S. 918 (1988); 
Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir. 1988) (same), decision with- 
dmwn in part, 893 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1989); National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. 
United States, 688 F. Supp. 671 (D.D.C. 1988) (statute restricting president's au- 
thority to protect confidentiality of national security information), vacated sub nom. 
American Foreign Serv. Ass'n v. Garfinkel, 490 US. 153 (1989). 
67. See Frank B. Cross, The Constitutional Legitimacy and Signif~ance of 
Presidential Signing Statements, 40 ADMIN. L. REV. 209, 210-12 (1988); Daniel B. 
Rodriguez, Statutory Interpretation and Political Aduantage, 12 INT'L REV. L. & 
ECON. 217, 226 (1992). 
68. Such hopes have rarely been fulfilled. See, e-g., Cross, supra note 67, a t  
234-35; William D. Popkin, Judicial Use of Presidential Legislative History: A Cri- 
tique, 66 IND. L.J. 699, 702-03 & ~ . 1 4 ,  17 (1991). 
44 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I995 
statutory ambiguities in a way favored by the presidentcg and 
by creating a record that can be used later to  refute claims that 
the president has approved of constitutionally dubious provi- 
sions in bills that the president has chosen to sign because of 
his desire to  see other provisions of the legislation become law. 
During the Bush years, the constitutional issues addressed 
in signing statements dealt mostly with questions of presiden- 
tial authority, and they seem designed mostly to  serve the 
third purpose listed above, namely avoiding the appearance 
that the President approved of objectionable provisions in legis- 
lation he signed. This concern with appearances is quite strik- 
ing: Bush's signing statements are pervaded by an amazing 
scmpulosity about the separation of powers that becomes at 
times almost comical. Even a cursory review of the record sug- 
gests that the administration tried to iden te  and deal with 
every issue, no matter how small, in every bill that was pre- 
sented to the President. The lengths to which the Bush admin- 
istration was prepared to go in applying legalistic analysis to  
enrolled bills, moreover, are suggested in the following droll 
passage from the signing statement for the 1991 defense autho- 
rization bill: 
[Slection 1409(a) refers to a classified annex that was pre- 
pared to accompany the conference report on this Act and 
states that the annex "shall have the force and effect of law 
as if enacted into law." The Congress has thus stated in the 
statute that the annex has not been enacted into law, but it 
nonetheless urges that the annex be treated as if it were law. 
I will certainly take into account the Congress' wishes in this 
regard, but will do so mindful of the fact that, according to 
the terms of the statute, the provisions of the annex are not 
Similarly, the President claimed in another signing statement 
that provisions in a bill that purported to give the force of law 
to  language in a classified annex to  the bill were legal nullities 
because the annex was not presented to the President along 
with the bilL7' 
69. See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 27 W ~ Y .  
COMP. PREs. DOC. 1701 (Nov. 21, 1991). 
70. President's Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 1991, 26 WKLY. COW. FQEs. DOC. 1766, 1767 Wov. 5, 1990). 
71. Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Years 1990 and 1991, 25 W m .  COMP. FQEs. DOC. 1841, 1842 (Nov. 29, 1989). 
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This kind of hyperlegalistic interpretation was comple- 
mented by a grand attempt at comprehensive scrutiny. Each 
year, for example, the President issued a statement claiming 
that all legislative veto provisions would be treated as legal 
nullities.72 Numerous signing statements challenged the legal 
validity of provisions that restricted the president's discretion, 
and the President sometimes seemed to threaten that he would 
act in defiance of the objectionable provisions. On at  least four 
occasions, he went so far as to  obtain a legal opinion from OLC 
concluding that it would be lawful for him to disregard a statu- 
tory provision,73 and he apparently acted contrary to statutory 
direction in at least one case.74 Although the President's con- 
stitutional objections to statutory provisions arose most often in 
the context of Bush's principal interest, foreign affairs,75 many 
72. See Statement on Signing the Treasury, Postal Service, and General Gov- 
ernment Appropriations Act, 1993, 28 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 1873, 1874 (Od. 6, 
1992); Statement on Signing the District of Columbia Mental Health Program As- 
sistance Act of 1991, 27 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 1575 (Oct. 31, 1991); Statement 
on Signing the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations 
Act, 1991, 26 W W .  COMP. PRES. DOC. 1768, 1769 (Nov. 5, 1990); Statement on 
Signing the Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations Act, 
1990, 25 WKLY. COMP. PREs. DOC. 1669, 1670 Wov. 3, 1989). 
One student of the legislative veto has counted more than 200 newly enacted 
legislative vetoes between the time of the Supreme Court's Chudha decision in 
1983 and the end of the 102nd Congress in 1992. Louis Fisher, The Legislative 
Veto: Invalidated, It Survives, LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBs., Autumn 1993, 273, at 288. 
73. Compare Statement on Signing the Departments of Commerce, Justice, 
and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1992, 27 WKLY. 
COW. PRES. DOC. 1529 (Oct. 28, 1991) with Issues Raised by sec. 129 of Pub. L. 
No. 102-138 and sec. 503 of Pub. L. No. 102-140, 16 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 18 
(1992) (preliminary print); Compare Statement on Signing the National and Com- 
munity Service Act of 1990, 26 WKLY. COW. PREs. DOC. 1833, 1834 Wov. 16, 
1990) with Appointment of Members of the Board of Directors of the Commission 
on National and Community Service, 14 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 173 (1990) (prelim- 
inary print); Compare Statement on Signing the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
of 1990, 26 WKLY. COW. PRES. DOC. 1764, 1765-66 (Nov. 5, 1990) with Constitu- 
tionality of subsection 4117(b) of Enrolled Bill H.R. 5835, the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1990, 14 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 170 (1990) (preliminary 
print); Compare Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 
Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, 26 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 266, 267 (Feb. 16, 1990) 
with Issues Raised by Section 102(c)(2) of H.R. 3792, 14 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 38 
(1 990) (preliminary print). 
74. Despite a statutory requirement that representatives of a legislative body 
be included in the United States delegation to the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, these negotiations appear to have proceeded without the 
inclusion of such legislative representatives. See McGinnis, supra note 55, at  310 
11.81 (citing interview with former staff member of the National Security Council). 
75. See, e.g., Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 1993, 28 WRLY. COMP. PREs. DOC. 2073 (Oct. 23, 1992); Statement on 
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dealt with matters, such as the arcana of the Appointments 
and Recommendation Clauses, in which he could not possibly 
have taken a passionate interest." 
It is impossible to  assess with certainty whether the Bush 
administration's veto and signing statement strategy will prove 
to have any lasting effects. The strategy was defensive, consist- 
ing almost entirely in resisting new congressional encroach- 
ments into areas that were thought to  be reserved by the Con- 
stitution to  the Executive's discretion. In order to  measure the 
consequences of this resistance, one would need to determine 
what precedents would have been created but for the resis- 
tance, and to  determine what significance those precedents 
would have had in the hture. Once the Clinton administration 
begins to establish its own approach to veto messages (if there 
prove to  be any) and signing statements, some useful compari- 
sons may begin to emerge. On the evidence that now exists, 
however, i t  remains quite possible that the Bush 
administration's strategy amounted to  little more than a kind 
of gesturing through which it sought to signal its intention-or 
reserve its rights-to seize ground from Congress if the oppor- 
tunity to do so ever arose. Absent evidence that such opportuni- 
ties arose and were taken, it is difficult to  see how Bush's veto 
messages and signing statements could have any real or lasting 
importance. 
B. Compromise of the Constitutional Vetoes 
The four Bush vetoes that were apparently based solely on 
constitutional grounds reinforce this suspicion. They are there- 
fore worth examining is some detail, for their contribution t o  
legal and political developments can only be understood by 
examining the reasoning on which they were based and by 
observing how the President subsequently dealt with what 
proved to be ongoing disputes. 
Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Ad, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, 27 
WRLY. COMP. PREs. DOC. 1526 (Oct. 28, 1991); Statement on Signing the Foreign 
Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Ad, 1990, 25 
W ~ Y .  COMP. PREs. DOC. 1810, 1811 (Nov. 21, 1989). 
76. See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Reclamation States Emergency 
Drought Relief Act of 1991, 28 WW. COMP. PREs. DOC. 413 (March 5, 1992); 
Statement on Signing the Bill Modifving the Boundaries of the Alaska Maritime 
National Wildlife Refuge, 26 W m .  COMP. PRES. DOC. 1897 (Nov. 21, 1990). 
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1. The Appointments Clause 
One minor piece of pork barrel legislation sponsored by a 
Democratic Senator was vetoed solely because of provisions 
that violated the Appointments Clause.77 This bill, which was 
named in honor of former Congressman Morris Udall, would 
have assigned authority to  make determinations about eligibili- 
ty for Federal funds to a board dominated by members not 
appointed by the president. President Bush emphasized in his 
veto message that his refusal to approve the bill was based 
solely on constitutional grounds and that he had no substantive 
or policy objections to the legislation. But when the President 
was presented with a successor bill that he deemed constitu- 
tionally invalid because of a different type of Appointments 
Clause violation, he signed it anyway.78 Fidelity to  the consti- 
tutional analysis that provoked the f i s t  veto thus proved less 
than thoro~ghgoing.'~ 
President Bush's concession in this case can usefully be 
contrasted with another incident in which he was more success- 
ful in getting what he wanted. When he approved the National 
and Community Service Act of 1990,8O Bush issued a signing 
statement discussing what he regarded as constitutional de- 
fects in the provision establishing a commission created by the 
statute to administer the most important programs established 
in the act. Under the statute, various restrictions were placed 
on the president's freedom to  choose nominees for this commis- 
sion. The President regarded these restrictions as violations of 
the Appointments Clause, and said that they were "without 
legal force or effect."' 
77. See Memorandum of Disapproval for the Morris K. Udall Scholarship and 
Excellence in National Environmental Policy Ad, 27 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 1877 
(Dec. 20, 1991). 
78. See Statement on Signing the Morris K. Udall Scholarship and Excellence 
in National Environmental and Native American Public Policy Act of 1992, 28 
WIUY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 507 (March 19, 1992). Adding insult to injury, the second 
bill treated the President's pocket veto of the first bill as a nullity by purporting 
to repeal legislation that Bush had purported to veto. See id. 
79. The Senator who sponsored the bill was chairman of the appropriations 
subcommittee with jurisdiction over the Office of Management and Budget, which 
may help explain the President's lack of policy objections to the bill as well as his 
compromise on the constitutional issues. For accounts of the influence of the Direc- 
tor of the Office of Management and Budget during the Bush administration, see 
CHARLE~ KOLB, WHITE HOUSE DAZE: THE UNMAKING OF D O M E ~ C  POLICY IN THE 
BUSH YEARS (1994); JOHN PODHOREIZ, HELL OF A RIDE: B A C ~ A G E  AT THE WHITE 
HOUSE FOLLIES 1989-1993 (1993). 
80. Pub. L. No. 101-610, 104 Stat. 3127 (1990). 
81. Statement on Signing the National and Community Service Act of 1990, 
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So long as the President refused to nominate candidates 
for the commission, the congressionally mandated programs 
could probably not have been administered." In his signing 
statement, the President also indicated that while he was not 
particularly enthusiastic about the programs that this commis- 
sion was t o  implement, he strongly favored a separate part of 
the act that authorized funding for one of his own favorite 
progra~ns.'~ Congress therefore had reason to believe that the 
President might very well rehse to make the nominations 
required by the statute. In a burst of speed that would other- 
wise be mystifying, Congress passed remedial legislation bring- 
ing the statute into conformity with the President's view of the 
Appointments Clause early in the next legislative session? 
What distinguishes this case from the one involving the Udall 
bill is that here the President's political and policy interests 
were fvmly aligned with his interest in the Appointments 
Clause, whereas the objections to the Udall bill seem to have 
been rooted solely in constitutional principle. 
2. Presidential control over foreign policy 
In late 1990, President Bush vetoed a bill dealing with 
export controls on certain goods with military applications 
because of provisions requiring that sanctions be imposed on 
countries that use or distribute chemical and biological weap- 
ons. The President did not object to such sanctions on policy 
grounds, and he made this clear by signing an executive order 
that directed the imposition of the same sanctions contained in 
the bilLg5 What he did object to was the "rigid" and "mandato- 
ry" imposition on him of a legal obligation to impose the sanc- 
tions, which interfered with what he called his "constitutional 
responsibilities" t o  conduct the nation's foreign policy.86 
26 WKLY. COMP. ~ E s .  DOC. 1833, 1833-34 (Nov. 16, 1990). 
82. See Appointment of Members of the Bd. of Directors of the Comm'n on 
Nat71 and Community Serv., 14 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 173 (1990) (preliminary 
print). 
83. 26 WKLY. COMP. PREs. DOC. at 1833. 
84. See National and Community Sew. Technical Amendments Act of 1991, 
Pub. L. No. 102-10, 105 Stat. 29 (1991). 
85. The executive order was signed before the bill was vetoed, and was re- 
ferred to in the President's veto message. 
86. See Memorandum of Disapproval for the Omnibus Export Amendments 
Act of 1990, 26 WKLY. COW. PREs. DOC. 1839, 1839 (Nov. 16, 1990). 
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Although the President's objection to  the export control bill 
was clearly rooted in his understanding of the constitutional 
separation of powers, he did not claim that such interference 
violated the Constitution. His constitutional objections were 
also not clearly distinguishable from his concerns about imme- 
diate practical consequences that the bill might have during 
what proved to be the prologue to  the Gulf War: "The mandato- 
ry imposition of unilateral sanctions as provided in this bill 
would harm U.S. economic interests and provoke friendly coun- 
tries who are essential to  our efforts to resist Iraqi aggres- 
~ion."~' The relative importance of these practical concerns 
was confirmed, after the Gulf War had been successfully prose- 
cuted, when the President signed a bill with mandatory-sanc- 
tions provisions that differed little from those to which he had 
objected earlier." This outcome, together with the attenuated 
nature of the President's original constitutional objections, 
makes it impossible to regard his veto of the original version of 
the mandatory sanctions as an important sign of commitment 
to constitutional principles. 
3. Congressional responses to Iran- Contra 
The two other vetoes that President Bush exercised on 
constitutional grounds were more significant, but they, too, 
were followed by compromises that substantially undercut their 
importance. The vetoed bills were part of a highly complex 
struggle between the Bush administration and the Congress 
over legislative efforts to prevent a repetition of certain activi- 
ties that had occurred in connection with the Iran-Contra af- 
fair. In simplified form, many individuals on the Hill were 
determined 1) to require that Congress be kept fully and con- 
temporaneously informed about covert actions (like the arms 
sales t o  Iran); and 2) to ensure that when Congress placed 
limits on the president's ability to take certain foreign policy 
actions directly (like the limits placed at times on assisting the 
Contras), the president would not be able to take those same 
87. Id. The bill was presented to the President only a few weeks before 
American and allied troops invaded Iraq. 
88. See Foreign Relations Authorization Ad, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, 
Title V, Pub. L. No. 102-138, 105 Stat. 647, 722 (1991); Statement on Signing the 
Foreign Relations Authorization Ad, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, 27 WKLY. COMP. 
PREs. DOC. 1526 (Oct. 28, 1991). 
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actions indirectly by imposing on other nations to carry out 
activities prohibited by U.S. law. 
In late 1989, President Bush was presented with a bill that 
made it a felony for anyone in the Executive to  "assist" others 
(including foreign governments) in carrying out diplomatic 
initiatives that the Executive itself is prohibited by statute 
from pursuing directly. The bill also required the president to 
notify Congress whenever anyone in the Executive "advocates, 
promotes, or encourages" the provision of material assistance 
by others for activities that the Executive itself is forbidden by 
statute to assist with or undertake.89 As President Bush noted 
when he vetoed this bill, its vague and sweeping provisions 
threatened to interfere with the conduct of foreign affairs by 
exposing diplomats and other officials to the threat of imprison- 
ment for engaging in discussions that might later be found to 
constitute a prohibited form of "assistance." President Bush 
also observed that the threat to  the president's constitutional 
role in conducting foreign relations was heightened by the fact 
that those who serve in Congress would remain free to  engage 
in the very diplomatic activities forbidden to the Exec~tive.~' 
The resulting timidity and disarray in the conduct of foreign 
policy, said the President, would be "wholly contrary to the 
allocation of powers under the Constit~tion."~' 
The following year, President Bush vetoed another bill that 
would have had similar effects. This second bill contained a 
complex set of provisions designed to  force the president to  
notify Congress about covert actions more promptly than Presi- 
dent Reagan had informed the legislature about the secret 
arms sales to Iran during the 1 9 8 0 ' ~ . ~ ~  As part of this effort to 
ensure greater congressional involvement in the conduct of 
covert actions, the bill defined such covert actions t o  include 
any "request" by our government to a foreign government or 
private citizen to conduct a covert action on behalf of the 
89. The full text of the provision, which is summarized here, can be found in 
section 109 of H.R. 1487, which was vetoed on November 21, 1989. A complete 
legal analysis of this provision would require a more extended discussion of various 
terms and qualifications than is necessary here. 
90. See Message to the House of Representatives Returning Without Approval 
the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, 25 WRLY. 
COMP. PREs. DOC. 1806 (Nov. 21, 1989). 
91. Id. at 1806. 
92. The full text of the provisions can be found in Section 602 of S. 2834, 
lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), which was vetoed on November 30, 1990. 
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United States. This definition was sufficient to provoke the 
President's veto (although the provisions dealing with notifica- 
tions to Congress about covert actions were no less impor- 
tant).g3 In language reminiscent of that used the previous 
year, President Bush criticized the bill's vagueness about the 
meaning of reportable "requests," and complained that this 
vagueness "could have a chilling effect on the ability of our 
diplomats to conduct highly sensitive discussions concerning 
projects that are vital to our national ~ecurity.'"~ Because the 
contested provision of this bill did not forbid diplomatic discus- 
sions but only required that they be reported, and because it 
did not include provisions for criminal sanctions, it could not 
easily be characterized as unconstitutional (and the President's 
veto message did not use that term). President Bush's decision 
to  veto the bill therefore seemed to reflect a serious determina- 
tion to  resist congressional meddling in the prerogatives of his 
office and to  preserve the traditional separation of powers even 
beyond what he saw as the strict requirements of the Constitu- 
tion. 
It should come as no surprise that President Bush was 
most aggressive in his defense of the authority of his office in 
the field of foreign relations, where his expertise and interest 
were greatest. The veto messages dealing with prohibited forms 
of "assistance" and with reportable "requests" reflect this em- 
phasis, and they are also typical of the highly nuanced and 
sophisticated constitutional analysis that runs consistently 
93. The provisions of the bill dealing with the timing of the president's 
obligatory notifkation of covert actions were part of a separate constitutional and 
policy dispute between the Congress and the President. The story of that dispute's 
origins and development is quite complicated, but the result can be summarized in 
simple terms: President Bush reluctantly made concessions on this issue, as he did 
on the others reviewed in this article. Compare The President's Compliance with 
the 'Timely Notification7 Requirement of Section 501(b) of the National Security 
Act, 10 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 159, 173-74 (interpreting the National Security Act 
to leave the president "virtually unfettered discretion" to choose when to notify 
Congress of covert actions) with Pub. L. No. 102-88 $ 602, 105 Stat. 429, 441-44 
(1991) (reenacting the operative language on timely notification); H.R. REP. NO. 66, 
102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (conference report on the bill that became Pub. L. No. 
102-88) (rejecting OLC's conclusion and interpreting the reenacted language to 
require notification "within a few days"); Statement on Signing the Intelligence 
Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991, 27 WKLY. COMP. PREs. DOC. 1137, 1137 (Aug. 
14, 1991) (expressing pleasure that the revised provision on timely notification "in- 
corporates without substantive change the requirement found in existing law"). 
94. See Memorandum of Disapproval for the Intelligence Authorization Act, 
Fiscal Year 1991, 26 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 1958 (Nov. 30, 1990). 
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through almost all of the Bush veto messages and signing 
statements. Viewed in isolation, however, these two veto mes- 
sages could be quite misleading. First, i t  should not be over- 
looked that the group of officials most directly threatened by 
these two bills was composed of career foreign service officers, 
a potent interest group within the government and one that 
counted among its own the man then serving as Deputy Secre- 
tary of State (and later as Secretary). More important, the 
Bush administration proved willing to compromise, and in a 
very serious way, exactly the principles that seemed to be a t  
the center of the President's decisions to veto these two bills. 
To see how this happened, one has to begin by examining 
yet another bill that was vetoed in 1989. Two days before he 
vetoed the bill that would have prohibited American officials 
from "assisting" others in certain foreign policy activities, Presi- 
dent Bush had vetoed an appropriations bill that contained two 
provisions that he said were unacceptable. One of those provi- 
sions had to do with funding for abortions in countries receiv- 
ing U.S. foreign aid. The other provision, which was sponsored 
by Representative David Obey and which closely resembled the 
vetoed ban on "assistance," would have prohibited the use of 
certain appropriated funds either "for the purpose of furthering 
any military or foreign policy activity which is contrary to [ex- 
press prohibitions in] United States law" or "to solicit the provi- 
sion of funds by any foreign government (including any instru- 
mentality or agency thereof), foreign person, or United States 
person, for the purpose of furthering any military or foreign 
policy objective which is contrary to [express prohibitions in] 
United States law."g5 The Obey Amendment also contained 
provisos that purported to leave U.S. officials Gree to express 
their own views or those of the president. When he vetoed the 
bill, President Bush acknowledged that these provisos might 
allow the Obey Amendment to be constmed in  a way that he 
would consider constitutionally acceptable. He nevertheless 
complained that "the section as a whole remains sufEciently 
ambiguous to present an unacceptable risk that it will chill the 
conduct of our Nation's foreign affairs? 
95. The full text of the provision is set out in H.R. 2939, which was vetoed 
on November 19, 1989. 
96. Message to the House of Representatives Returning Without Approval the 
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Ad, 
1990, 25 WKLY. COMP. PREs. DOC. 1783, 1784 (Nov. 19, 1989) (emphasis added). 
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The President's decision to veto this bill because of ambi- 
guities in the Obey Amendment that created an "unacceptable 
risk" of chilling the conduct of our foreign relations, however, 
did not turn out to be the end of the story. Because this amend- 
ment was a rider to an appropriations bill sent to the President 
near the end of a congressional session, the legislature had to 
respond to the President's veto by passing a new bill. Two days 
later, the President signed a new version of the bill, from which 
the controversial abortion-funding provisions had been re- 
moved. The Obey Amendment, however, remained in the bill in 
a slightly modified form. Under the new version, American offi- 
cials were barred from providing appropriated funds to  any 
foreign government or other person "in exchange for" that gov- 
ernment or person undertaking an action that U.S. law ex- 
pressly prohibited the American officials themselves from en- 
gaging in. 
President Bush's signing statement recognized that the 
new version of the Obey Amendment, though less sweeping 
than the first, had the same kind of potential to  chill the con- 
duct of foreign affairs: "Many routine and unobjectionable dip- 
lomatic activities could be misconstrued as somehow involving 
a forbidden 'ex~hange."'~' Why then did the President sign the 
bill? Following a pattern characteristic of many Bush signing 
statements, in which he interpreted objectionable provisions so 
as to  render them consistent with his view of the Constitution 
(though often completely inconsistent with the statutory lan- 
g ~ a g e ) ? ~  the President contended that the Obey Amendment 
97. Statement on Signing the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and 
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1990, 25 W W .  COMP. PREs. DOC. 1810, 
1811 (Nov. 21, 1989). 
98. See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Reclamation Projects Authorization 
and Adjustment Act of 1992, 28 WRLY. COMP. PREs. DOC. 2232, 2233 (Oct. 30, 
1992); Statement on Signing the Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992, 28 WKLY. 
COW. PREs. DOC. 2185 (Oct. 28, 1992); Statement on Signing the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, 28 WRLY. COMP. P ~ s .  DOC. 2073 (Oct. 23, 
1992); Statement on Signing the Reclamation States Emergency Drought Relief Act 
of 1991, 28 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 413 (March 5, 1992); Statement on Signing 
the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 1991, 27 WKLY. COMP. PREs. DOC. 1873 
(Dec. 19, 1991); Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, 27 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 1769 (Dec. 5, 1991); 
Statement on Signing the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program 
Reauthorization Act, 26 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 1843 (Nov. 16, 1990); Statement 
on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, 26 WKLY. 
COMP. PREs. DOC. 1766 (Nov. 5, 1990); Statement on Signing the North American 
Wetlands Conservation Act, 25 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 1949 @ec. 13, 1989); 
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covered only transactions "in which U.S. funds are provided to 
a foreign nation on the express condition that the foreign nation 
provide specific assistance to  a third ~ountry.'"~ The signing 
statement also maintained that because the Obey Amendment 
applied only where U.S. law "expressly prohibits" American 
officials from taking an action, it would not apply where U.S. 
statutes "merely limit funding to undertake such an ac- 
tion."loO 
The President's interpretation was in some respects simply 
irreconcilable with the statutory language. The Obey Amend- 
ment, for example, unambiguously referred to  exchanges with 
any "foreign person or United States person," not just to ex- 
changes with "foreign  nation^."'^' Similarly, the Obey Amend- 
ment prohibited U.S. officials from inducing others to under- 
take "any action" that the American government is forbidden 
from taking, not just actions in which a foreign nation "pro- 
vide[~] specific assistance to a third country." Where the 
President's interpretation of the Obey Amendment's text was 
not preposterous, it was far-fetched. The natural and obvious 
meaning of the phrase "in exchange for" clearly covers implicit 
agreements as well as transactions based on an express condi- 
tion, especially in a statutory provision that carefully distin- 
guishes implicit from express prohibitions. And there is pre- 
cious little room in the statute's language for the President's 
claim that laws which limit funding for certain activities do not 
expressly prohibit U.S. officials from providing funding in ex- 
cess of those limits; on the contrary, it has for a very long time 
been a felony, pursuant to  an express and general statutory 
prohibition, for government officials to  make expenditures be- 
yond the limits set in appropriations legislation.lo2 
In a desperate attempt to  shore up his utterly implausible 
interpretation of the Obey Amendment's language, President 
Bush sought to  rely on the amendment's legislative history to 
Statement on Signing the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1990, 25 
WRLY. COW. PRES. DOC. 1809 (Nov. 21, 1989). 
99. Statement on Signing the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and 
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1990, 25 WKW. COW. PREs. DOC. 1810, 
1811 (Nov. 21, 1989) (emphasis added). 
100. Id. 
101. Compare Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs 
Appropriations Act, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-167, 103 Stat. 1195 (1989) with 25 
WKLY. COW. PRES. DOC. at 1811. 
102. 31 U.S.C. $8 1341, 1350. 
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show that his interpretation reflected congressional intent. But 
he had little to rely on. Flouting standard canons of statutory 
construction, the Bush signing statement ignored those por- 
tions of the legislative history that courts consider the most 
reliable indicia of legislative intent, such as statements by the 
sponsor of the provision in question (which in this case was 
Representative Obey, who chaired the appropriations subcom- 
mittee with jurisdiction over the bill). Instead, President Bush 
referred vaguely to  statements by Representative Mickey Ed- 
wards (the ranking Republican on the subcommittee), and to a 
colloquy between two Republican Senators (Kasten and 
Rudman). lo3 
When one examines the legislative history of the Obey 
Amendment, the flimsiness of the administration's legal argu- 
ment becomes even more apparent. Representative Obey made 
it clear that the intent of his amendment was to prohibit ap- 
propriated funds from being "expended in any way to  promote 
or entice other governments to  support policies which would be 
illegal if followed by the United  state^."'^^ Representative 
Edwards, moreover, who helped negotiate the fmal version of 
the Obey Amendment and'on whom the Bush signing state- 
ment purports to  rely, never said that the Amendment requires 
an express agreement. Edwards said that a violation of the 
provision would have t o  be based on a "quid pro quo," which is 
just another way of describing the provision of funds "in ex- 
change for" some action.'" The term "quid pro quo" no more 
103. 25 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. at 1811. 
104. 135 CONG. REC. H9088 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1989). See also id. at H9089 
(amendment says that "if this administration wants to try to accomplish a foreign 
policy purpose, which is contrary to a specific prohibition in U.S. law, it cannot 
use money in this bill to do itwstatement of Mr. Obey). 
105. See id. at H9089 (statement of Mr. Edwards). There is one statement in 
the Congressional Record that might seem to offer some support for the President's 
interpretation. The day after the bill containing the Obey Amendment was passed 
by the House of Representatives, Obey went on the floor and declared (on behalf of 
himself and Representative Edwards) that "the word 'exchange' should be under- 
stood to refer to a direct verbal or written agreement." 135 CONG. REC. H9231 
(daily ed. Nov. 21, 1989). This statement does not go as far as the Bush signing 
statement, for a "directn agreement would not necessarily have to be an "express" 
agreement, but it does go further in the direction favored by the President than 
prior statements by Obey and Edwards had gone. Under standard canons of statu- 
tory construction, however, the statement of November 21 would be difficult to use 
as a meaningful indicator of congressional intent because it was made after legisla- 
tive action on the bill had been completed. 
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excludes implicit agreements than the statutory "in exchange 
for" language does. '" 
The President's invocation of Representative Edwards' 
statements t o  support his narrow construction of the Obey 
Amendment was baseless, and his reliance on a colloquy be- 
tween Senators Kasten and Rudman was not much better. 
Immediately after the House passed the bill containing the 
Obey Amendment, the Senate debate began. At the end of that 
debate, Senator Kasten offered a substitute amendment that 
would have replaced the Obey provision with language forbid- 
ding U.S. officials from providing appropriated funds pursuant 
to  agreements under which, "as an express condition for receipt 
of such assistance," the recipients would undertake military or 
foreign policy activities that are illegal under American 
law.''' Kasten, who was openly serving as the Bush 
administration's agent on this issue, withdrew this amendment 
after engaging Senator Rudman (who had generally opposed 
the administration's position on related issues) in a planned 
colloquy. According to the transcript of the colloquy in the Con- 
gressional Record, Rudman asserted that violations of the Obey 
Amendment should not give rise to criminal penalties, and that 
the words "in exchange for" should be understood to  refer to 
agreements under which U.S. aid is provided on the "express 
condition" that the recipient undertake an action that U.S. 
officials are legally forbidden to  carry out.lo8 
Because no objections were raised to Senator Rudman's 
interpretation, which the record indicates was offered on the 
floor immediately before the bill containing the Obey Amend- 
ment was passed by the Senate, the Kasten-Rudman colloquy 
106. See, e.g., Evans v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1881, 1892 (1992) ( K e ~ e d y ,  
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment): 
The requirement of a quid pro quo means that without pretense of any 
entitlement to the payment, a public official violates § 1951 if he intends 
the payor to believe that absent payment the official is likely to abuse 
his office and his trust to the detriment and injury of the prospective 
payor or to give the prospective payor less favorable treatment if the quid 
pro quo is not satisfied. The official and the payor need not state the 
quid pro quo in express terms, for otherwise the law's effect could be 
frustrated by knowing winks and nods. The inducement from the official 
is criminal if it is express or if it is implied from his words and actions, 
so long as he intends it to be so and the payor so interprets it. 
Id. 
107. 135 CONG. REC. S16361 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1989). 
108. Id. at S16362-63. 
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may not be completely worthless as an indicator of the Senate's 
intent.log Even if one assumes that the colloquy firmly estab- 
lishes that the Senate's interpretation of the Obey Amendment 
was the same as the President's, however, the record in the 
House does not support that interpretation, at least with re- 
spect t o  whether a violation must be based on an express 
agreement. And since the meaning suggested by the debates in 
the originating chamber is more consistent with the language 
of the provision, a disinterested interpreter such as a court 
would almost certainly reject the construction put on the stat- 
ute in the Bush signing statement. 
It is true that the second version of the Obey Amendment 
was less threatening to the president's conduct of foreign af- 
fairs than either of the predecessor versions that President 
Bush used his veto to stop. The President's signing statement, 
moreover, may have helped prevent the new law from being 
used as a tool of partisan or ideological combat. But President 
Bush gave up a great deal when he signed the bill containing 
the second version of the Obey Amendment. To see how much 
he surrendered, one need only look at his signing statement's 
claim that the Senate record made it clear that "neither the 
criminal conspiracy statute, nor any other criminal penalty" 
would apply to  violations of the Obey Amendment."' Even if 
one assumes, perhaps somewhat heroically, that the courts 
would apply the rule of lenity (which counsels that ambiguous 
statutes should be construed in favor of criminal defendants), 
such legislative history could not prevent an Independent 
Counsel from procuring indictments based on the general con- 
109. One commentator has attempted to make the Kasten-Rudman colloquy 
seem irrelevant by falsely asserting that "their colloquy concerned an amendment 
that Senator Kasten himself withdrew when it faced rejection by Congress." 
CHARLES TIEFER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PRESIDENCY: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S 
STRATEGY FOR GOVERNING WITHOUT CONGRESS 39 (1994). Although Kasten's 
amendment was before the Senate when the colloquy took place, the colloquy itself 
"concerned" the Obey Amendment. Kasten, moreover, withdrew his own amendment 
because he accepted the colloquy as an adequate substitute for his own amend- 
ment, and Tiefer does not demonstrate that "it faced rejection by Congress." While 
it would be naive to think that the Kasten-Rudman colloquy could possibly have 
served the administration's interests as well as the Kasten Amendment would 
have, it would equally be naive (or tendentious) to assume without proof that the 
Obey Amendment could have been enacted without the concession to the President 
that was embodied in the Kasten-Rudrnan colloquy. 
110. Statement on Signing the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and 
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1990, 25 WKLY. COMP. PREs. DOC. 1810, 
1811 (Nov. 21, 1989). 
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spiracy statute."' Lawrence Walsh had done this and more 
when he prosecuted Oliver North and others for conspiring t o  
obstruct government functions by evading two of the so-called 
Boland Amendments (which put restrictions on aid to the Nica- 
raguan Contras)." Everyone concerned clearly understood 
that the Obey Amendment was an effort to make it easier (not 
more difficult) to discourage government officials from engaging 
in activities like those engaged in by the targets of Walsh's 
investigations. Nor could anyone who was involved in the con- 
duct of foreign policy during this period have had less than an 
acute awareness of the costs that an Independent Counsel can 
impose on his targets even when he fails to  make his criminal 
charges stick. Neither the president nor anyone else could 
assure American diplomats either that similar indictments for 
violating the Obey Amendment would not be brought or that 
the courts would rule against the validity of such prosecu- 
t ion~."~ To the extent that American diplomats chose to take 
their legal advice from the President's signing statement, or 
from the more elaborate but equally dubious legal opinion sub- 
sequently issued by OLC,ll4 the Obey Amendment could have 
had little chilling effect. But when one considers how reckless 
or self-sacrificing it would have been t o  take the President's 
statement as legal advice, any notion that the President's con- 
cession in signing the Obey Amendment into law was an unim- 
portant surrender dissipates like the insubstantial haze of the 
legal analysis in the signing statement itself.ll5 
111. 18 U.S.C. $ 371 (Supp. 1995). This statute authorizes prosecutions for 
conspiracies to commit offenses that are not themselves criminally punishable. See 
United States v. Hutto, 256 U.S. 524 (1921). 
112. Technically, Walsh did not charge North and the others with conspiracy 
to violate the Boland Amendments, but this seems only to have been a matter of 
trial tactics. In his final report, Walsh said: "Independent Counsel could as a mat- 
ter of law have framed the conspiracy charge in that fashion, and its evidence at 
trial would have proved that the conspirators violated the Boland Amendment." 
LAWRENCE . WALSH, IRAN-CONTRA: THE FINAL REPORT 67 (1994). 
113. The President's signing statement, together with a legal opinion based on 
it, see Criminal Penalties Under Pub. L. No. 101-167, Section 582, 14 Op. Off. 
Legal Counsel 93 (preliminary print 1990), that was later issued by the Justice 
Department, might have been sufficient to justify the Attorney General in refrain- 
ing from seeking the appointment of an Independent Counsel for alleged violations 
of the Obey Amendment. As the Iran-Contra prosecutions illustrated, however, an 
Independent Counsel appointed because of other alleged legal violations would be 
free to procure an indictment based on violations of the Obey Amendment. 
114. Id. 
115. The Obey Amendment has been reenacted in subsequent appropriations 
bills. The current version can be found in Pub. L. No. 103-87, $ 533, 107 Stat. 931 
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C. The War Powers Resolution 
President Bush's use of veto messages and signing state- 
ments-which articulated, without insisting on, an aggressive 
view of his constitutional prerogatives-resembles his approach 
to  the War Powers Res~lution."~ Section 4(a)(1) of this stat- 
ute, which was enacted over President Nixon's veto in 1973, re- 
quires that the President file a report with Congress within 
forty-eight hours after U.S. forces are introduced "into hostili- 
ties or into situations where imminent involvement in hostili- 
ties is clearly indicated by the  circumstance^."^^^ A report un- 
der this section of the statute triggers a sixty-day deadline 
within which the president is required to terminate the use of 
military forces unless Congress authorizes their continued 
depl~yment."~ The president is also required to  report cer- 
tain other kinds of military deployments in foreign nations, but 
these do not trigger a deadline that would force him t o  seek 
congressional authorization. 
Like other presidents beginning with Nixon, President 
Bush regarded the sixty-day limit as unconstitutional. Except 
for one ambiguous reference to section 4(a)(l) by President 
Ford after the Mayaguez incident, no president has ever sub- 
mitted a report acknowledging that the sixty-day clock had 
been triggered.llg While technically complying with a narrow 
construction of the reporting requirements of the War Powers 
Resolution, President Bush was relatively aggressive in assert- 
ing the statute's irrelevance t o  his conduct. After using Ameri- 
can air power to  help suppress a coup in the Philippines, for 
example, Bush notified Congress of the actions he had taken, 
but sought to avoid conceding that his military decisions could 
be constrained by that statute: 
This measured action by U.S. Forces was taken at my direc- 
tion in accordance with recognized principles of international 
(1993). When he signed this legislation into law, President Clinton made no men- 
tion of the Obey Amendment. See Statement on Signing the Foreign Operations 
Appropriations Legislation, 29 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 1945 (Sept. 30, 1993). 
116. 50 U.S.C. $8 1541-1548 (1988). 
117. Id. $ 1543(a). 
118. Id. $ 15446). 
119. Thomas M. Franck, Rethinking War Powers: By Law or By "Thaumaturgic 
Inuocation"?, 83 AMER. J .  INPL L. 769 & n.13 (1989). The Ford administration 
conceded that the evacuation of Saigon fell within section 4(aX1), but this conces- 
sion came after the time had lapsed for a report under that section. Overview of 
the War Powers Resolution, 8 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 271, 278 (1984). 
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law and pursuant to my constitutional authority with respect 
to the conduct of foreign relations and as Commander in 
Chief. I am mindful of the historical differences between the 
Executive and Legislative branches and the positions taken 
by me and all my predecessors in office with respect to the 
constitutionality of certain provisions of the War Powers Res- 
olution. I am sharing this information with you consistent 
with that Resol~tion. '~~ 
A few weeks later, the President ordered the invasion of Pana- 
ma. Once again noting that his report was t'consistent with" 
(not "pursuant to") the War Powers Resolution, the President 
said the invasion: 
was necessary to protect American lives in imminent danger 
and to fillfill our responsibilities under the Panama Canal 
Treaties. . . . The military operations were ordered pursuant 
to my constitutional authority with respect to the conduct of 
foreign relations and as Commander in Chief.l2l 
The following year, after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the Presi- 
dent grew bolder still. In his letter notifying Congress of sub- 
stantial troop deployments to the Gulf, he said that Iraq's mili- 
tary was "capable of initiating further hostilities with little or 
no additional preparation," and that "Iraq's actions pose a di- 
rect threat to neighboring countries and to  vital U.S. interests 
in the Persian Gulf region."lP Despite this reference to fur- 
ther hostilities, however, the President implied that the sixty- 
day clock in the War Powers Resolution had not been triggered, 
and that in any event the statute would not affect the 
President's military decisions: 
I do not believe involvement in hostilities is imminent; to 
the contrary, it is my belief that this deployment will facili- 
tate a peacefbl resolution of the crisis. If necessary, however, 
the Forces are Mly prepared to defend themselves. Although 
it is not possible to predict the precise scope and duration of 
120. Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President Pro Tempore of the 
Senate on United States Military Assistance to the Government of the Philippines, 
25 W m .  COMP. PREs. DOC. 1867, 1868 (Dec. 2, 1989). 
121. Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President Pro Tempore of the 
Senate on United States Military Action in Panama, 25 WKLY. COW. PRBS. DOC. 
1984, 1985 (Dec. 21, 1989). 
122. Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President Pro Tempore of the 
Senate on the Deployment of United States Armed Forces to Saudi Arabia and the 
Middle East, 26 WKLY. COW. PRES. DOC. 1225 (Aug. 9, 1990). 
THE DEFENSE OF THE PRESIDENCY 
this deployment, our Armed Forces will remain so long as 
their presence is required to  contribute to the security of the 
region and desired by the Saudi government to enhance the 
capability of Saudi armed forces to defend the Kingdom. 
I have taken these actions pursuant to my constitational 
authority to conduct our foreign relations and as  Commander 
in Chief.123 
Despite frequent claims that Bush and other presidents have 
evaded the War Powers Resolution, or deliberately avoided 
compliance with it,'24 the statute's language has made it fair- 
ly easy for presidents to engage in what they saw as appropri- 
ate military actions without having to flout its terms or even to 
acknowledge that the constitutionally questionable sixty-day 
clock had begun to  run.'" As the examples above illustrate, 
President Bush took full advantage of the statute's wording to 
avoid the risk of acting in clear contravention of its terms. 
Events in the Gulf, however, finally closed off this path. 
As it became clear that Iraq was unlikely to surrender its 
ambitions in the face of threats and economic sanctions alone, 
the President was apparently undecided about the advisability 
123. Id. After a large deployment of additional forces later that year, President 
Bush again notified Congress of what he had done. In this case, however, he did' 
not even mention the War Powers Resolution. He did, however, restate his belief 
. that hostilities were not "imminent." Letter from President George Bush to the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the 
Senate, 26 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 1834, 1835 (Nov. 16, 1990). 
124. See, e.g., HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY C O N S T ~ I O N :  
SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 39, 133, 190 (1990); McGinnis, 
supra note 55, at 316 & 11.117, 319; Rolph, supra note 50. But cfi KOH, supra, at  
112, 126-27 (seeming to acknowledge that there has been a high degree of presi- 
dential compliance with the strict terms of the War Powers Resolution). Presidents 
have certainly construed every ambiguity in the War Powers Resolution in their 
own favor, and one can make plausible arguments against some of these presiden- 
tial interpretations. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSITI'U- 
TIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 49 & n.10 (1993); ROBERT F. 
TURNER, REPEALING THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: RESTORING THE RULE OF LAW 
IN US. FOREIGN POLICY 122 (1991). While the Presidents' interpretation of the 
statute (as of the Constitution) may be disputable, so are the interpretations of the 
presidents' critics. No court has ever held that any president has violated the War 
Powers Resolution, and Congress itself has never voted to tighten its language or 
to impose new requirements that were omitted from the existing version. 
125. This is not to say that the War Powers Resolution has had no effect. 
Some military operations, for example, may have been conducted in a way calculat- 
ed to avoid triggering certain provisions of the statute. See, e.g., TURNER, supra 
note 124, at  137 (American military advisers in El Salvador forbidden to  cany M- 
16 riiles). 
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of seeking congressional authorization for a military offensive. 
Administration officials had consistently maintained that such 
authorization was not legally required,126 and the Secretary 
of Defense is said t o  have worried that prosecution of the war 
would become impossible if Congress voted against authorizing 
the use 'of force.ln The President, however, decided to seek 
congressional authorization before attacking Iraq, and he suc- 
ceeded in obtaining iti 
The President's decision may have been politically prudent, 
and it may even have reflected a consensus among his legal 
advi~0rs. l~~ Subsequent events, however, by no means' dis- 
proved the argument attributed t o  Secretary Cheney: that if 
the use of force turned out to be successful and the costs were 
reasonably low, it would not matter what kind of debate or vote 
there had been in Congress, whereas if the military operation 
failed or the costs of victory were very high, prior congressional 
authorization would not save the President from taking the 
blame. 
President Bush, moreover, clearly passed up an obvious 
opportunity to  frustrate congressional efforts to establish a 
precedent adverse to  his claims about the unconstitutionality of 
the War Powers Resolution. When he asked Congress for legis- 
lation, the President was careful not to ask for statutory "au- 
thorization," but only for a bill stating that Congress "supports 
the use of all necessary means to [liberate Ku~ai t ] ." '~~ And 
126. E.g., David Hoffman, Baker Says Iraq Is Abusing Hostages; Health of 
American Wuman Shields' Reported to Be Deteriorating, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 1990, 
at A1 ("Bush said yesterday he believes he has ample authority to act in the gulf 
without prior approval from Congress. 'History is replete with examples where the 
president has had to take action,' Bush said. 'And I've done this in the past and 
certainly . . . would have no hesitancy at all.'"); US'. Policy in the Persian Gulfi 
Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 
(Oct. 17, 1990) (testimony of Secretary of State Baker); Crisis in the Persian Gulf 
Region: U S .  Policy Options and Implications: Hearings Before the Senate Committee 
on Armed Services, l O l s t  Cong., 2d Sess. @ec. 3, 1990) (testimony of Secretary of 
Defense Cheney). 
127. BOB WOODWARD, THE COMMANDERS 343-44 (1991). 
128. One journalist reports that there was general agreement among the 
President's legal advisors about the desirability of obtaining congressional authori- 
zation. Apparently reflecting this wnsensus, the Deputy Attorney General (who at 
that time was William P. Barr) is said to have advised the President that he had 
the authority to proceed unilaterally, but nonetheless recommended that congressio- 
nal authorization be obtained because "[wlar is in the gray zone." Id. at 344-46. 
129. Id. at 344. 
130. Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Persian Gulf Crisis, 27 WKLY. 
COMP. PRES. DOC. 17, 18 (Jan. 8, 1991). 
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when he was presented instead with legislation expressly pro- 
viding the legal authorization required by the War Powers 
Res~lution,'~' the President's signing statement emphasized 
that 
my request for congressional support did not, and my signing 
this resolution does not, constitute any change in the 
long-standing positions of the executive branch on either the 
President's constitutional authority to use the Armed Forces 
to defend vital U.S. interests or the constitutionality of the 
War Powers Res01ution.l~~ 
The President may not have conceded that he needed this reso- 
lution as a legal matter, but after he requested a mere resolu- 
tion of support and then signed this one instead, his claims 
about the legal irrelevance of the War Powers Resolution could 
themselves only look quite irrelevant. 
D. Summary 
President Bush's signing statements and veto messages, 
like his statements about the War Powers Resolution, dis- 
played a consistent and relatively aggressive approach to  the 
separation of powers issues that arose from congressional ef- 
forts to subject the administration to  a variety of statutory 
restrictions. In this sense, the Bush record represents a kind of 
triumph for the academically oriented lawyers responsible for 
crafting the President's statements.'= Upon closer exami- 
nation, however, this victory appears t o  have been one more of 
form than substance. The aggressive signing statements do not 
appear to have reflected much actual resistance to congressio- 
nal control, and each of the vetoes based on constitutional ob- 
jections was followed by substantial compromise of the prin- 
ciples on which those vetoes were based. With respect to the 
War Powers Resolution, President Bush simply (though per- 
131. Pub. L. No. 102-1, 105 Stat. 3 (1991). 
132. Statement on Signing the Resolution Authorizing the Use of Military 
Force Against Iraq, 27 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 48 (Jan. 14, 1991). 
133. For many years, OLC has attracted lawyers with prestigious educational 
records, and many have gone on to academic careers. McGinnis, supra note 31, at  
422, 424 & 11.185. During the Bush administration, C. Boyden Gray (himself a 
former Supreme Court clerk) broke with prior practice by hiring people with simi- 
lar paper credentials to work in the White House Counsel's office. See The True 
Believers, 23 National Journal 2018 (Aug. 17, 1991). 
64 BRIGHAM: YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I995 
haps sensibly) flinched when presented with circumstances in 
which he could have put his bold words to  a test. 
IV. THREE RETREATS FROM THE ADMINISTRATION'S 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES 
If the lawyers' "successes" do not seem to suggest that 
their role in the development of separation of powers law was 
particularly important, the lawyers9 "failures" provide even 
stronger evidence that their influence did not amount to much. 
The Bush record shows that his administration was simply 
unwilling to defend its theories of the Constitution on several 
important occasions. A brief look at some of these departures 
from the principled jurisprudence articulated in the Bush sign- 
ing statements and veto messages will help to illuminate the 
forces that discourage a thoroughgoing implementation of a 
principled jurisprudence of the separation of powers. 
A. Legislative Vetoes 
Early in its tenure, the Bush administration sought to  be 
done with the contentious matter of the Nicaraguan Contras, 
which had been inherited from President Reagan. After invest- 
ing a significant amount of his own time in negotiations, the 
Secretary of State reached an agreement with congressional 
leaders that provided temporary b d i n g  to support the 
Contras. Part of these so-called "Central American Accords" 
required the administration to  promise in writing that no mon- 
ey would be used to support the Contras after a date certain 
unless the chairmen of four congressional committees approved 
the continued funding in writing.ls4 Neither OLC nor the 
Counsel to the President (nor for that matter the State 
Department's own Legal Adviser) was consulted about this 
arrangement,'" which incorporated a formal legislative-veto 
device that would clearly have been unconstitutional under the 
Chadha decision had it been adopted in legislation.ls6 There 
was speculation in the press that personal factors may have 
134. See Robert Pear, Unease is Voiced on Contra Accord, N.Y. RMEs, March 
26, 1989, at Al, col. 5. Although the Central American Accords between the Presi- 
dent and Congress were published by the Executive, the part of the agreement 
discussed here was omitted from the published version. See Bipartisan Accord on 
Central America, 25 WRLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 420 (March 24, 1989). 
135. See Pear, supra note 134. 
136. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
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contributed to the absence of advance consultations, and it can 
hardly be doubted that the Secretary of State and the Counsel 
to the President had an uneasy relationship.ls7 But there was 
no suggestion that the agreement's impact on the president's 
ability to protect the authority of his office was overlooked. On 
the contrary, one State Department official who took part in 
the negotiations was quoted as saying that "the precedential 
aspects of this agreement were well and truly understood" by 
Secretary of State Baker and other negotiators.ls8 Instead, it 
appears that the President decided that resolving the very 
contentious issue of aid to the Contras was simply more impor- 
tant than maintaining a principled opposition to the use of 
legislative vetoes. The fact that the newly inaugurated Presi- 
dent felt quite free to make this decision without consulting 
OLC, the Counsel to the President, or any other legal officer in 
the government, is a striking illustration of how unlikely it is 
that a president would ever allow the concerns that lawyers 
have with the interests of his office to determine his conduct in 
that office. 
The flap over the agreement to  comply with a non-statuto- 
ry legislative veto attracted considerable attention because the 
Counsel to the President made the mistake of voicing his objec- 
tions in the press.lsg During the ensuing years, however, no 
attention at all was paid the fact that President Bush routinely 
signed bills containing real legislative vetoes that clearly violat- 
ed the Chadha rule, unlike the Contra funding agreement 
(which was not technically unconstitutional). Although the 
President also routinely issued statements denouncing the 
congressional practice of including such 'legal nullities" in bills 
that were presented to him,140 I have found no recorded ex- 
ample of the Bush administration's refusing t o  comply with any 
of the innumerable legislative vetoes to which it was subjected. 
Nor does the Bush administration seem to  have taken any 
137. See, e.g., Bernard Weinraub, Gray-Baker Vendetta: A Long-Running Tale 
Of Potomac Intrigue, N.Y. RMEs, March 29, 1989, at A16, col. 1. 
138. Pear, supra note 134; see also Helen Dewar & David Hoffman, Baker De- 
nies Contra-Aid Agreement Sets Precedent for Power-Sharing: Draft Letter on As- 
sistance Plan Circulating Among Hill Leaders, WASH. POST, April 8, 1989, at A9; 
R.W. Apple Jr., A Balance of Bush, the Congress and the Contras, N.Y. TIMES, 
April 2, 1989, at Dl, col. 1. 
139. See Pear, supra note 134; Bendavid, supra note 5, at 14 ("'I was right to 
object,' Gray maintains. 'But Secretary Baker was mad, understandably so, because 
I had talked to the press before raising the matter in-house.'"). 
140. See supra note 72. 
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other action that might have discouraged the Congress from 
flouting one of the few apparently significant post-Watergate 
Supreme Court victories for the ofice of the president.l4l 
B. The Appointments Clause 
It is easy to imagine why President Bush might make the 
trade-off between politics and principle that he accepted in the 
Central American Accords, especially when one considers that 
the arrangement did not involve an actual violation of the Con- 
stitution. The same cannot be said, however, of another depar- 
ture from well-settled principles of the separation of powers. 
On August 9, 1989, President Bush signed into law the Finan- 
cial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 
1989 ("FIRREA"), which effected a massive restructuring of the 
regulatory regime governing the savings-and-loan industry. As 
part of that restructuring, an independent agency known as the 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board ("FHLBB") had most of its 
functions transferred to a new entity, called the Office of Thrift 
Supervision ("OTS"), which was located within the Department 
of the Treasury. When he signed the bill, President Bush did 
not mention that the new statute contained a provision that 
purported to appoint as the first Director of OTS the individual 
who had been Chairman of the FHLBB.142 
Such a provision, under which an officer of the United 
States is appointed by statute, is about as clear a violation of 
the Appointments Clause of the Constitution as one could hope 
to fmd. If one were familiar only with the fastidious attention 
to Appointments Clause issues that pervades the Bush 
141. For a detailed study of the struggle within the Reagan administration 
over the litigation strategy that led to the successful attack on the legislative veto, 
see BARBARA -ON CRAIG, CHADHA: THE STORY OF AN EPIC C O N ~ O N A L  
STRUGGLE (1988). The post-Chadha pattern, in which legislative vetoes are usually 
imposed in appropriations bills rather than in substantive legislation (probably 
because of the special powers of intimidation possessed by appropriators), suggests 
that the principal effect of Chadha, to the extent it has had any at all, may have 
been a slight shift in the relative power of congressional appropriations committees 
in comparison with authorizing committees. Legislative vetoes, especially committee 
vetoes, have of course also continued to be exercised through extra-statutory mech- 
anisms, as Chadha clearly permits. Neither Bush nor any other president seems to 
have made much of an effort to curb this practice, which could hardly be less 
objectionable than the Contra funding agreement. For examples of the use of extra- 
statutory mechanisms, see Fisher, supra note 72, at  288-91. 
142. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, 
Pub. L. No. 101-73, $ 301, 103 Stat. 183, 278. 
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administration's signing statements and with the President's 
decision to veto one bill solely because of a less clear-cut viola- 
tion of the Appointments Clause,'43 acquiescence in the statu- 
tory appointment of a federal officer might be surprising, or 
even shocking. The President's failure to object to  this element 
of the bill when he signed it, however, becomes easier to under- 
stand when one recognizes the still more extraordinary fact 
that the Bush administration had itself proposed the same kind 
of illegal statutory appointment in a savings-and-loan bill it 
had transmitted to the Congress a few months earlier? 
This blunder led directly to  litigation brought by a thrift 
whose assets OTS was threatening to seize.'45 In the course 
of the law suit, which challenged the authority of OTS to act on 
the ground that its director had been unconstitutionally ap- 
pointed,'" the Director resigned and was eventually replaced 
by an official appointed in the constitutionally prescribed man- 
ner. Before that happened, however, the Bush administration 
put forward the desperate argument that the statutory appoint- 
ment was valid because the chairmanship of the FHLBB and 
the directorship of OTS were the same office, a position em- 
phatically rejected by the district court.'" This litigation, 
which threatened serious disruption of OTS' regulatory work, 
143. Memorandum of Disapproval for the Morris K. Udall Scholarship and 
Excellence in National Environmental Policy Act, 27 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 1877 
(Dec. 20, 1991). 
144. 135 CONG. REC. 51513, $1535-36 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1989). 
145. Olympic Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass'n v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 
732 F. Supp. 1183, 1191-92 (D.D.C.), dismissed as moot, 903 F.2d 837 @.C. Cir. 
1990). 
146. The plaintiff that brought the constitutional challenge was represented by 
Charles J. Cooper, who had been Assistant Attorney General for OLC during the 
Reagan administration. 
147. 732 F. Supp. 1183, 1192-93 (D.D.C. 1990). The court also rejected a num- 
ber of efforts by the government to evade the Appointments Clause through boot- 
strapping arguments based on the Vacancies Act and on an alleged "inherent pow- 
er" of the president to fill vacant offices without regard to the Appointments 
Clause. These efforts, too, were rejected by the court. Id. at  1193-1200. 
Ironically, one of the greatest differences between OTS and the FHLBB is that 
OTS falls clearly under the president's legal control, while the FHLBB did not. It 
is diBcult to imagine, however, that the long-term benefits to the constitutional 
order that might be thought to result from the abolition of a single independent 
agency could outweigh the risks to that order that were presented by the Justice 
Department's defense of the statutory appointment. Apparently, this thought even- 
tually made an impression on the Justice Department itself, which went out of its 
way in a subsequent case t o  endorse the position adopted by the District Court in 
the FIRREA litigation. See Brief for the Respondent, 1991 WL 521272, at *40, 
Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 US. 868 (1991) (No. 90-762). 
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became moot when a new Director was confirmed by the Sen- 
ate and appointed by the President."' 
Given the Bush administration's scrupulous attention to 
the Appointments Clause in other contexts, including one veto 
that was based solely on an Appointments Clause objec- 
tion,14' its flagrant disregard of constitutional forms in this 
case is quite striking. William P. Barr, who served at the head 
of OLC when the President signed the bill enacting the viola- 
tion into law, has publicly stated that OLC "recognized an 
Appointments Clause problem" in the bill.lSO He also reports 
that many people in the Treasury Department and Congress 
thought it was "absurd" to worry about such an issue, so that 
"the views of the Department of Justice were overridden. Politi- 
cal deals were made, and the bill passed."151 Read carefully, 
Barr's account is highly revealing. First, it refers only to a bill 
in which OLC '%ecognized" a constitutional "problem." No men- 
tion is made of the fact that the Bush administration itself had 
formally proposed adopting the blatantly unconstitutional stat- 
utory appointment mechanism. Second, there is no suggestion 
that OLC's constitutional objections were communicated to the 
President or to the White House Counsel. Nor is there any 
suggestion that the Department of Justice recommended that 
the President veto the bill, despite Barr's statement in the very 
same paragraph that "[wlhen a provision raises constitutional 
difficulties, in most cases the Attorney General should recom- 
mend veto."152 It is hard to resist the inference that the De- 
148. Olympic Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass'n v. Director, Office of ThriR Supervision, 
903 F.2d 837 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 907 (1991). 
149. See Memorandum of Disapproval for the Morris K. Udall Scholarship and 
Excellence in National Environmental Policy Act, 27 WRLY. COMP. PREs. DOC. 1877 
(Dec. 20, 1991). The President also expressed his concern with the Appointments 
Clause in his signing statements. E.g., Statement on Signing the Bill Modifying the 
Boundaries of the Alaska Maritime National Wildlife Refuge, 26 WnY. COMP. 
PREs. DOC. 1897 (Nov. 21, 1990); Statement on Signing the National and Commu- 
nity Service Act of 1990, 26 WRLY. COW. PREs. DOC. 1833 (Nov. 16, 1990). 
150. William P. Barr, Attorney General's Remarks, Benjamin Cardozo School of 
Law, November 15, 1992, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 31, 38 (1993). 
151. Id. 
152. Id. In conjunction with this statement, Barr went on to say that an At- 
torney General who believes that a bill is unconstitutional should recommend that 
it be vetoed even if he also believes that the courts would uphold it. He then cited 
an academic article (written by an OLC alumnus) contending that the president is 
obliged by the Constitution to veto such bills. Id. at  38 11.33 (citing Michael B. 
Rappaport, The President's Veto and the Constitution, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 735, 771- 
76 (1983)). Absent from this passage is any discussion of whether the Assistant 
Attorney General for OLC might have an obligation to ensure that his view of the 
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partment of Justice was cutting its own "political deals" with 
those at Treasury and on the Hill who thought OLC's concerns 
were "absurd." 
What might the "political deals" involving the unconstitu- 
tional appointment provision have involved? Press speculation 
centered on the theory that the Bush administration-as the 
price for bringing the functions performed by the FHLBB under 
the control of the Treasury Department-acquiesced in a 
scheme to  install the Chairman of the FHLBB, who had close 
personal ties to  a powerful Republican Senator, as Director of 
OTS. Under this theory, the unconstitutional appointment 
(which was strongly opposed in the House of Representatives) 
was necessary to avoid codmation hearings involving some- 
one who had been intimately involved in the operation of the 
FHLBB. The reason for this, in turn, was that such hearings 
had the potential t o  embarrass other Senators who were sus- 
pected of having improperly interfered with regulatory deci- 
sions of the FHLBB.153 None of this suggests what interests 
the Justice Department (in contradistinction to  the Treasury 
Department) might have had in participating in any political 
deals, though one could easily come up with plenty of hypothe- 
ses. The most important conclusion for present purposes, how- 
ever, does not require a choice among such hypotheses. What 
the FIRREA episode suggests is that circumstances can arise in 
which the president's constitutional lawyers themselves bar- 
gain away the interests of his office for purposes of their own 
even in an administration in which the president himself has 
made the defense of that office an important goal. That this 
may have happened during the Bush administration is a re- 
minder that the president's lawyers have interests other than 
serving their client--even (or especially) if their client is as- 
sumed to be the presidency itself. The Justice Department's 
acquiescence in the unconstitutional statutory appointment 
may therefore be usefuily compared with the phenomenon 
illustrated by the Contra funding incident. Just as the presi- 
Constitution's requirements is conveyed to the president. 
153. See, e.g., Robert A. Rosenblatt & Sara Fritz, S&L Bailout Compromise Re- 
turns to Haunt Congress, LA. TIMES, April 6, 1990, at Dl, col. 2; Editorial, Trying 
Days for the Thrifi Bailout, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, March 27, 1990, at 20; 
Editorial, Another S&L Delay, WASH. POST, March 26, 1990, at A10; Court Gives 
Thrifi Agency A Reprieve, WASH. POST, March 24, 1990, at D12; Jerry Knight, 
Court Ruling Disrupts Thrift Bailout: Judge Holds Top Regulators' Appointments 
Unconstitutional, WASH. POST, March 22, 1990, at Al .  
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dent has interests that he must weigh against those of the of- 
fice he holds, so his lawyers may be tempted to forego the in- 
terests of his ofice to pursue an agenda of their own. 
C. The Mask of "Complicated and'lndirect Measures" 
The Contra-funding and FIRREA examples expose some 
important forces that necessarily limit any single-minded pur- 
suit of the institutional interests of the presidency. Whatever 
intrinsic importance one may attach to the principles at stake 
in these incidents, however, neither departure from principle 
was likely to produce a truly large or enduring effect on the 
structure of government or on the law of the separation of 
powers. For an illustration of the Bush administration's aban- 
donment of constitutional principles when something very sig- 
nificant was actually at stake, it is useful to  examine the histo- 
ry of the Supreme Court's decision in Metropolitan Washington 
Airports Authority v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft 
Noise, Inc. ("Airports Case")? This case proved to be an im- 
portant victory for the interests of the president's office-in 
fad, it was probably the most important case involving those 
interests decided during the Bush administration. But the 
outcome was one that the President's lawyers actually opposed 
in the courts. 
The Airports Case arose from a congressional effort to  
create an ingenious substitute for the legislative veto device 
that the Supreme Court had declared unconstitutional in 
Chadha. To the extent relevant here, the story begins in 1984, 
when a consensus developed that capital improvements at 
Washington National and Dulles Airports could best be carried 
out if operating control and financial responsibility for the 
airports were transferred from the federal Department of 
Transportation to  some sort of newly created state, local, or 
interstate entity? In 1986, after consultations among execu- 
tive agencies and interested congressional staffers over the best 
means of effecting such a transfer, OLC reviewed three differ- 
ent proposals that would have given Congress substantial pow- 
154. 501 U.S. 252 (1991). 
155. See Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise v. Metropolitan Washing- 
ton Airports Auth., 718 F. Supp. 974, 976 (D.D.C. 1989), rev'd, 917 F.2d 48 (D.C. 
Cir. 1990); Plaintiffs' Exhibit 2 in the Joint Appendix filed with the Supreme Court 
in the Airports Case. Dulles and Washington National were the only two civilian 
airports operated by the federal government. 
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ers to supervise the new entity.'" These powers were in the 
nature of legislative vetoes, and were manifestly intended to 
substitute for the informal oversight powers that Congress and 
certain of its officers and committees had been exercising in  the 
normal course of administration while control of the airports 
was vested in the Department of Transportation. 
Under one proposal, state authorities would have been 
authorized to operate the airports, but Congress would have 
created a board of review comprising several members and 
officers of Congress; this board would have been empowered to 
veto the most important decisions of the new operating authori- 
ty. OLC emphatically rejected this proposal because it would 
constitute a legislative veto in violation of Chadha. Under a 
second proposal, Congress would have required Virginia and 
the District of Columbia to establish the same kind of review 
board under state law, as a condition of their being allowed to 
gain control of the airports. Characterizing this proposal as one 
that presented "complex and novel questions involving the 
relationship between federal and state grants of authority," 
OLC gave an  elaborate legal analysis and concluded, despite its 
"grave reservations" about the proposal's constitutionality, that 
"a colorable argument" could be made in its defense.''' 
The third proposal was similar to the second proposal ex- 
cept that  a) the members of the review board would serve in  
their "personal capacities" as users of the airport and not as 
representatives of Congress, and b) the members of the review 
board would be members of Congress appointed by the new 
state operating authority from a list of names submitted by the 
congressional leadership. OLC declared that this proposal 
would probably withstand constitutional scrutiny, and declined 
to object to it on legal grounds. 
156. See Plaintiffs' Exhibit 3 in the Joint Appendix filed with the Supreme 
Court in the Airports Case. This document is a letter from the Assistant Attorney 
General for Legislative Affairs to  the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on 
Aviation of the Committee on Public Works and Transportation. The detailed con- 
stitutional argumentation in the letter, however, could hardly have been provided 
by any office other than OLC. And OLC does in fact routinely draft such letters. 
Kmiec, supm note 53, at 338. Although the letter characterizes the three proposals 
reviewed in it as "alternatives proposed by your s t d , "  there had apparently been 
some prior consultations and it is not clear that all the ideas reflected in these 
alternatives necessarily originated with congressional staff. On the contrary, it is 
quite conceivable that OLC itself devised one or more of the alternatives. 
157. OLC's reservations arose largely from INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 
(1983), and Bowsher v. Synar, 478 US. 714 (1986). 
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The provision finally enacted in 1986 closely resembled the 
third proposal, which had been cleared by OLC earlier that 
year. After Virginia and the District of Columbia enacted the 
required enabling legislation, and the Secretary of Transporta- 
tion entered into long-term leases with the new operating au- 
thority, the board of review was appointed from lists provided 
by the congressional leadership. In 1988, a citizens' suit was 
brought, challenging the new arrangement on the ground that 
the veto power granted to the board of review was unconstitu- 
tional. 
In 1989, afier George Bush became president, the District 
Court ruled that the legislative veto device created through the 
statute was constitutional. Appeal was taken, and the Depart- 
ment of Justice intervened in the Court of Appeals to  defend 
the constitutionality of the statute.'" The Court of Appeals, 
however, reversed the district court, holding that the device 
violated the separation of powers because the members of the 
board of review were in reality agents of the Congress.'" 
At this point, the Justice Department began behaving in 
an equivocal manner. Although it had intervened in the Court 
of Appeals to defend the constitutionality of the statute, it 
declined to join the airport authority's petition for certiora- 
ri?' When the Supreme Court granted the petition, the Unit- 
ed States automatically became a re~pondent, '~~ and it filed a 
brief on the merits that offered the Court little more than an 
expression of the government's ambivalence. 
This ambivalence might more accurately be described as 
incoherence. On the one hand, the Justice Departmentla ar- 
gued that the mere fact that the board of review was created 
pursuant to state law did not preclude its being characterized 
as an agent of Congress, and therefore invalid under Chadha 
(which forbids legislative vetoes) or under Bowsher (which 
forbids agents of Congress fiom exercising executive authori- 
158. See 718 F. Supp. at 975. 
159. See the docket entries in the Joint Appendix f led with the Supreme 
Court in the Airports Case. 
160. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc. v. Metropolitan Wash- 
ington Airports Auth., 917 F.2d 48, 56-57 0 . C .  Cir. 1990). 
161. See Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for the Abate- 
ment of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 US. 252, 262-64 (1991). 
162. Id. at 264 & n.12. 
163. Because the Solicitor General was disqualified from this case, the brief 
was filed by one of his deputies. 
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ty).'" The Justice Department's brief correctly observed that  
treating the board of review as a mere creature of state law 
would open "a massive loophole in the separation of powers." 
To permit such influence laundering would allow Congress to 
require the states, as a condition of receiving federal financial 
assistance, to appoint members of Congress to state offices 
controlling the administration of virtually all roads, schools, 
housing, and health care, thereby completely supplanting the 
federal agencies through which the president performs his 
central function of executing t h e  federal laws. In a stunning 
effort to evade the compelling logic of this argument, however, 
the Justice Department then claimed that the statute at issue 
in the Airports Case was constitutionally valid. Noting that 
members of Congress on the board of review were supposed to 
serve in their "personal capacities," the Justice Department 
contended that such individuals were especially well suited to 
represent the interests of all other users of the airports because 
members of Congress must make fkequent trips between Wash- 
ington and their home districts. The Court was invited to 
imagine that members of Congress would somehow be appro- 
priate representatives of airport users because they use the 
airports heavily, while they would not be appropriate represen- 
tatives of those who use roads, schools, and hospitals because 
they merely partake in those programs to the same extent as 
other citizens. 
The Supreme Court understandably dismissed this argu- 
ment by observing that the facts of the case "belie the ipse dixit 
that the Board members will act 'in their individual capaci- 
ties.'"lB5 Rather than accept this "individual capacity" fiction, 
the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, holding that the 
board-of-review device, although difficult to characterize, logi- 
cally must be either an  effort to exercise legislative power in  
violation of Chadha o r  an attempt to exercise executive power 
in  violation of B o w ~ h e r . ' ~ ~  Repudiating the  Justice 
Department's unprincipled suggestion that the Court uphold 
the statute while essentially confining the case to its facts, 
Justice Stevens forcefully explained why such ad hoc constitu- 
tional decision-making should be avoided: 
164. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Bowsher v. Spar, 478 U.S. 714 
(1986). 
165. 501 U.S. at 267. 
166. Id. at 275-76. 
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One might argue that the provision for a Board of Review is 
the kind of practical accommodation between the Legislature 
and the Executive that should be permitted in a "workable 
government." Admittedly, Congress imposed its will on the 
regional authority created by the District of Columbia and the 
Commonwealth of Virginia by means that are unique and 
that might prove to be innocuous. However, the statutory 
scheme challenged today provides a blueprint for extensive 
expansion of t h e  leg is la t ive  power beyond i t s  
constitutionally-confined role. Given the scope of the federal 
power to dispense benefits to the States in a variety of forms 
and subject to a host of statutory conditions, Congress could, 
if this Board of Review were valid, use similar expedients to 
enable its Members or its agents to retain control, outside the 
ordinary legislative process, of the activities of state grant 
recipients charged with executing virtually every aspect of 
national policy. As James Madison presciently observed, the 
legislature "can with greater facility, mask under complicated 
and indirect measures, the encroachments which it makes on 
the co-ordinate departments." Heeding his warning that legis- 
lative "power is of an encroaching nature," we conclude that 
the Board of Review is an impermissible encroachment.'" 
Perhaps the best that can be said about the Justice 
Department's brief is that it supplied the Supreme Court with 
the key argument needed for understanding the threat that the 
board-of-review device posed t o  the separation of powers. By 
contending that the argument did not apply in this case, how- 
ever, the Government's brief created a risk that the Court 
would misapprehend how serious that threat was. The signifi- 
cance of that risk is suggested by the fact that three dissenting 
Justices emphasized how odd it was that the Court was reach- 
ing out t o  protect the president's authority from a threat that 
the President's own lawyers denied was real: "Should Congress 
ever undertake such improbable projects as transferring na- 
tional parklands to the States on the condition that its agents 
control their oversight, there is little doubt that the President 
would be equal to the task of safeguarding his or her inter- 
ests."16' 
167. 501 U.S. at 276-77 (footnote and citation omitted). 
168. Airports Case, 501 U.S. at 293 (White, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
Justice White did not explain the distinction between national parklands and na- 
tional airports. 
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How can the strange behavior of the Justice Department 
be explained? The first crucial step obviously came in 1986, 
when OLC approved the scheme that was eventually invalidat- 
ed by the Supreme Court. This approval seems manifestly 
inconsistent with OLC's institutional propensity to  resist con- 
gressional efforts to undermine the principles articulated in 
Chadha and Bowsher, and it is easy to imagine that OLC's 
1986 decision reflected policy pressures from the Department of 
Transportation and the Office of Management and Budget. 
These agencies would undoubtedly have been more concerned 
with paying the price demanded by Congress for relieving the 
government of financial commitments and onerous operating 
responsibilities than with the niceties of constitutional law. 
Once OLC's clearance was obtained, and the statute was enact- 
ed, it is not the least bit surprising that the Justice 
Department's litigating divisions defended the scheme when it 
was challenged in court. The Department's litigation bureau- 
cracies are strongly predisposed to defend the constitutionality 
of federal statutes, and they would have had little or no incen- 
tive to second-guess OLC's earlier approval of this one. 
Surprisingly, the Justice Department continued to take 
this approach even after President Bush came into office and 
gave the defense of the presidency the kind of apparently seri- 
ous backing that it had lacked during the Reagan administra- 
tion. The Bush administration was notorious for its efforts t o  
avoid being perceived as "Reagan's third termT6' and it 
would have been easy to  abandon the Reagan-era OLC position 
when the Justice Department first entered the case in 1989. 
Even if one assumes that the case did not at that time receive 
the kind of serious attention within the Department that this 
In other cases, too, the Justice Department displayed an unwarranted faith in 
the president's ability or inclination to protect the interests of his office. See, e.g., 
Brief for Respondent, 1991 WL 521272, at *27, Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 
868 (1991) (arguing that president and Executive Branch "can be expected vigor- 
ously to challenge legislative encroachments on presidential prerogatives under [the 
Appointments] Clause"). The FIRREA case discussed above was a recent and strik- 
ing illustration of how dubious this proposition is, but it was by no means unique. 
See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 119 (1976) (illustrating an instance in 
which the Executive defended an invasion of the president's prerogatives under the 
Appointments Clause). In both the FIRREA and BucMey cases, the courts at least 
partly rescued the legal interests of the Executive from the Executive's effort to 
impair its own powers. 
169. Cf. Peggy Noonan, Why Bush Failed, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1992, at A35, 
col. 2 (analyzing the results of these efforts). 
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would have required, it would have been perfectly possible for 
the Department to change its position after the Court of Ap- 
peals bestowed upon the President a significant and unasked- 
for victory. Such confessions of error by the government are not 
common, but they are a traditional and well-accepted element 
of the Justice Department's practice.170 So long as they do not 
become so frequent as to undermine the Government's credibili- 
ty in the courts, their only negative effect is the embarrass- 
ment they cause to whichever individuals approved the position 
later abandoned by the Government.171 Thus, the fear of such 
embarrassment is the likeliest cause of the Justice 
Department's failure to change its position in the Airports Case.'" 
170. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Starr, Perspectives on the Judiciary, 39 AM. U. L. 
REV. 475, 484-85 (1990); John 0. McGinnis, Principle Versus Politics: The Solicitor 
General's Office in Constitutional and Bureaucratic Theory, 44 STAN. L. REV. 799, 
807 & n.45 (1992). 
171. President Bush himself demonstrated no reluctance to order the Justice 
Department to change its position in the Supreme Court when something he really 
cared about was at  stake. After meeting with representatives of interests materi- 
ally affected by a case that was before the Court, President Bush ordered his So- 
licitor General to file a brief contradicting the position that the Solicitor General 
had taken in an earlier brief to the Court in the very same case. See Reply Brief 
for the United States, 1991 WL 538730, at  *9-10 & n.*, United States v. Mabus, 
502 U.S. 936 (Nos. 90-1205, 90-6588). Linda Greenhouse, Bush Reverses U.S. 
Stance Against Black College Aid, N.Y. TIMES, O d .  22, 1991, at B6; Ruth Marcus, 
Bush S h i s  Stand on Aid to Black Colleges; Administration Now Supports In- 
creased State Funding in Mississippi Case, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 1991, at A6; cf. 
Linda Greenhouse, U.S. Changes Stance in Case on Obscenity, N.Y. TIMES, Novem- 
ber 11, 1994, at  A15. col. 1 (Solicitor General's position disavowed in subsequent 
brief signed by the Attorney General). 
172. This suggestion is reinforced by the history of another separation of pow- 
ers case that arose during the Bush administration. Pursuant to the statutory 
provisions governing the operation of the Tax Court (which is an Article I tribu- 
nal), the chief judge of the Tax Court appoints "special trial judges" to hear and 
decide certain kinds of cases. When the constitutionality of these appointments was 
challenged, the Justice Department at Grst defended their legitimacy on the theory 
that the Tax Court is a "court of law" within the meaning of the Appointments 
Clause. Upon realizing that the President himself had publicly rejected just such a 
characterization in a signing statement for a bill dealing with an analogous Article 
I tribunal, the Justice Department changed its position and began arguing that the 
chief judge of the Tax Court is the "head of a department" for purposes of the 
Appointments Clause. Although it might seem obvious and inevitable that the 
Justice Department would revise its position to conform with the President's (espe- 
cially since the President's position was undoubtedly formulated by the Justice 
Department itself), this apparently did not happen without a battle royale between 
OLC (which favored the interpretation more favorable to the interests of the presi- 
dency) and the Justice Department's Tax Division (which would have been the 
source of the original "court of law" interpretation). See Petition for Writ of Cer- 
tiorari, App. G, Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991); Daniel Klaidman, 
Burr Takes Hard Line on Executive Power; Senate Mulls AG Nominee's Record, LE- 
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If inertia was propelling the Justice Department to  defend 
this statute in the courts, the Court of Appeals' decision does 
seem to have introduced a bit of wobble into the trajectory, for 
the Justice Department declined to  seek certiorari after that 
decision. But the Department was never actually deflected from 
its course, even though its own brief in the Supreme Court 
clearly showed why a decision upholding the statute would 
pose a serious threat to  the interests of the presidency. The fact 
that the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court were both far 
more willing than President Bush's own Justice Department to  
defend the institutional interests of the presidency in this case 
is highly suggestive, especially when this incident is considered 
together with the FIRREA case. Judicial precedents are by 
nature more powerfd than the kinds of precedents about which 
the administration was so sc~pulous in its signing statements 
and veto messages. Despite the Bush administration's rhetori- 
cal commitment to the legal defense of the presidential office, 
the most enduring victory for that office was imposed by the 
courts in the face of outright resistance by President Bush's 
lawyers. Thus, when the outcome mattered most, the Bush 
administration was at its weakest in defending the president's 
constitutional interests. 
Lest one think that bureaucratic glitches or other special 
circumstances within the Justice Department are sufficient to  
explain the way the Airports Case was handled, the adminis- 
GAL TIMES, Nov. 11, 1991, at 1. If it was diff~cult for the Justice Department to 
change its litigating position in this case-where different components of the De- 
partment had already taken different positions on the critical issue (probably with- 
out either of them knowing what the other was doing), and where the President 
himself had already addressed the issue (albeit without knowledge of the incipient 
dispute)-it would presumably have been far more difficult to procure a change of 
position in the airports litigation. And, since there were apparently no overriding 
political imperatives in either case, it is reasonable to suppose that the different 
outcomes in the two cases resulted from the interplay of normal forces of bu- 
reaucratic inertia and personal vanity. 
It should also be noted that although the Justice Department did manage in 
the Tax Court case to present the Supreme Court with a constitutional analysis 
that was more consistent with the president's interests than its original position, a 
bare majority of the Court nonetheless adopted the conclusion that the Justice 
Department had originally advocated, and the Court's opinion took note of the 
change in the government's position. See Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 
888 n.5 (1991). The portion of the Freytag opinion dealing with this issue is so 
poorly reasoned (and was so incisively criticized in Justice Scalia's opinion concur- 
ring in the judgment) that it is entirely conceivable that its conclusion was able to 
attract a majority of the Court only because the government itself had originally 
advocated the same conclusion. 
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tration later confirmed that deeper forces were at work. A few 
months after the Supreme Court refused the invitation to cre- 
ate what the President's own lawyers called "a massive loop- 
hole in the separation of powers," Congress passed a bill 
amending the airport statute in response to the Court's deci- 
sion. This bill included yet another desperate effort by Con- 
gress to retain its control over Dulles and Washington National 
by creating a new board of review that differed only superficial- 
ly from the one that had been invalidated. Although member- 
ship on the new board was not in terms restricted to members 
of Congress, the board's members had to meet certain qualifica- 
tions that few people outside Congress would possess, and the 
congressional leadership was given complete control over choos- 
ing candidates for the board. The new board also lacked an 
absolute veto over the operating authority's decisions, but it 
was given the power to delay (for up to six months) important 
actions with which it disagreed. 
This congressional persistence in the pursuit of an uncon- 
stitutional goal can probably be explained by a strong and 
bipartisan fear that a state-controlled airports authority might 
inconvenience members of Congress by shifting some flights 
from the overburdened facilities a t  Washington National to 
Dulles w o r t  (which is several miles farther from the Capitol). 
Members may also have been concerned that they might lose 
the reserved, free parking places that they now enjoy at both 
airports.'" Although the President said that he considered 
this new device unconstitutional, he signed the bill into law 
anyway, blandly commenting that the courts would have to 
deal with the constitutional pr0b1em.l~~ This latest congres- 
173. On April 20, 1994, the Senate rejected a proposal that would have invited 
the airport operating authority to stop providing free parking near the Dulles and 
Washington National terminals to members of Congress. See 140 CONG. REC. 
54511-19, S4524 (daily ed. April 20, 1994). Five days later, the airport operating 
authority removed the signs at the reserved parking areas that read: "Reserved 
ParkingISupreme Court JusticedMembers of Congress/Diplomatic Corps." The re- 
served parking areas for members of Congress remained exactly where they had 
always been, but new signs were installed that say: "Restricted ParbinglAuthorized 
Users Only." Karen Foerstel, Signs Designating Members' Parking Are Removed 
From Both Airport Lots, ROLL CALL, May 16, 1994. 
174. See Statement on Signing the Intermodal Surface Transportation Effi- 
eiency Ad of 1991, 27 WRLY. COMP. PREs. DOC. 1861 (Dee. 18, 1991). The Bush 
administration appears never to have cleared up its pathetic confusion about the 
Airports Case, Shortly before leaving office, the President issued a signing state- 
ment evincing both an inability to articulate the principle of law for which the 
Airports Case stands and an inability to distinguish between construing a statute 
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sional gambit was eventually invalidated by the courts, which 
concluded that it violated the separation of powers under the 
analysis set forth in the Airports C a ~ e . " ~  Although the courts 
did curb this congressional overreaching again-an overreach- 
ing apparently motivated by the pettiest kind of self-inter- 
est-it will never be possible to  accuse the Bush administration 
of having been a significant contributor to that outcome. 
D. Summary 
The three examples discussed in this section show that the 
Bush administration was willing to tolerate and even advocate 
substantial losses of presidential legal authority in response to 
perfectly ordinary-and in some cases remarkably trivi- 
al-political pressures. As the examples suggest, such pres- 
sures sometimes operated directly on the president and some- 
times they seem to have had their effect at lower levels of the 
government. When one looks at these incidents-together with 
the results of the administration's strategy of using signing 
statements, veto messages, and presidential addresses to  artic- 
ulate an ambitious agenda for defending the presidency-there 
appears t o  be no evidence that the President's agenda was 
signdicantly furthered or even seriously pursued. Not only did 
the Bush administration fail to carry out a "precommitment 
strategy" of the kind described by Professor McGinnis, but it 
may have undermined its credibility on the Hill by wrapping 
itself rhetorically in high-flown constitutional "principles" that 
were abandoned as soon as adhering to them became inconve- 
nient. 
Perhaps the most remarkable example of the Bush 
administration's reluctance to act on its stated principles tran- 
spired after the President became a lame duck in the autumn 
of 1992. In a well-publicized series of judicial decisions growing 
out of an arcane dispute over the litigating authority of the 
U.S. Postal Senrice, President Bush and his Justice Depart- 
to avoid constitutional issues and declaring a statute unconstitutional. See State- 
ment on Signing the Reclamation Projects Authorization and Adjustment Act of 
1992, 28 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 2232 (Oct. 30, 1992). 
175. Hechinger v. Metropolitan Washington Airports Auth., 36 F.3d 97 0 . C .  
Cir. 1994), cert. denied 115 S. Ct. 934 (1995). 
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ment suffered serious setbacks on several important issues 
involving presidential legal authority.176 These losses are sig- 
nificant for present purposes not so much because they oc- 
curred, but because they could likely have been avoided if the 
administration had proceeded in a timely fashion according to 
the principles that it claimed to  treasure. 
On January 22, 1991, the U.S. Postal Service filed suit 
against the Postal Rate Commission in the Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit. Although such suits are specif- 
ically authorized by statute, they are constitutionally question- 
able because they assume that disputes within the executive 
establishment can be resolved by an entity outside the 
president's control. The principle at stake-that the executive 
department of government is a unitary entity subject to the 
president's control and supervision-implies that a suit brought 
by one executive agency against another is a kind of absurdity, 
like a person bringing suit against himself. It is also a principle 
that is central to the constitutional vision to which President 
Bush committed himself at the beginning of his administration, 
and which he affirmed in numerous signing statements 
throughout his term.177 
Despite the centrality of the unitary executive in the juris- 
prudence adopted by the Bush administration, the theory has 
176. The discussion below presents a simplified account of an extraordinarily 
complex dispute. For a more complete presentation of the legal and factual details, 
and a thoughtful analysis of the issues, see Neal Devins, Tempest in an  Envelope: 
Reflections on the Bush White House's Failed Takeover of the US. Postal Service, 
41 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1035 (1994). 
177. See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Housing and Community Development 
Act of 1992, 28 WRLY. COMP. PREs. DOC. 2186, 2186-87 (Oct. 28, 1992); Statement 
on Signing the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 
1992, 28 WRLY. COW. PRES. DOC. 2134, 2134-35 (Oct. 26, 1992); Statement on 
Signing the Energy Policy Act of 1992, 28 WRLY. COMP. PREs. DOC. 2094, 2096 
(Oct. 24, 1992); Statement on Signing the Treasury, Postal Service, and General 
Government Appropriations Act, 1993, 28 WRLY. COW. PRES. DOC. 1873, 1874 
(Oct. 6, 1992); Statement on Signing the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Improvement Act of 1991, 27 WKLY. COW. PREs. DOC. 1873 (Dec. 19, 1991); State- 
ment on Signing the Joint Resolution Settling the Railroad Strike, 27 WmY. COMP. 
PREs. DOC. 459, 459-60 (April 18, 1991); Statement on Signing the Bill Modifying 
the Boundaries of the Alaska Maritime National Wildlife Refuge, 26 WKLY. COMP. 
PREs. DOC. 1897 (Nov. 21, 1990); Statement on Signing the Energy and Water 
Development Appropriations Act, 1991, 26 WRLY. COMP. PREs. DOC. 1771, 1771-72 
(Nov. 5, 1990); Statement on Signing the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1989, 25 WRLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 1970, 1970-71 (Dec. 19, 1989); Statement on 
Signing the Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations Act, 
1990, 25 WRLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 1669, 1669-70 (Nov. 3, 1989). 
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met with a chilly reception in the courts, which have taken a 
relaxed attitude to the creation of independent agencies that 
are legally insulated from presidential control (at least when 
those agencies perform functions that do not seem to  be a t  the 
core of the president's own constitutional re~~onsibilities).'~~ 
When confronted with the Postal Service lawsuit, the adminis- 
tration therefore had two obvious choices. It could let the suit 
go forward, hoping that nobody would notice the retreat from 
administration principles. Or it could try to use the President's 
claimed authority over the two agencies to force them to re- 
solve their dispute outside the courts. 
This should have been an easy decision. The Postal Service 
is controlled by an eleven-member Board of Governors that 
comprises nine part-time Governors together with the Postmas- 
ter General and the Deputy Postmaster General (who are cho- 
sen by the Governors). At the time of this dispute, all of the 
Governors had been appointed by Presidents Reagan and Bush, 
and a majority were Republicans. Although the Postmaster 
General and his Deputy could have been expected to resist 
presidential control because they were full-time officials with a 
vested interest in their statutory independence, it should have 
been political child's play for a then-popular president to  per- 
suade a sufficient number of the part-time Governors to  avoid a 
confrontation with him over an obscure legal issue that he 
considered important. Had this occurred, a useful administra- 
tive precedent would have been created, and without the risk of 
any adverse judicial decisions. If the President had failed to  
persuade the Board of Governors to  go along with his wishes, 
the administration could then have made a considered decision 
whether to risk litigation or to  retreat t o  the passive role em- 
bodied in the first option. 
The Bush administration took neither of the obvious paths. 
Instead it entered a prolonged period of dithering, during 
which it relied on what one commentator has aptly called a 
178. See, e.g., Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935); Wiener 
v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); 
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989). 
There is a large academic literature dealing with various issues raised by the 
theory of the unitary executive. Good introductions to the underlying arguments on 
which the Bush administration's position must ultimately rest can be found in 
Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 41; Steven G. 
Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plu- 
ral Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1155 (1992). 
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strategy of "delay, threats, and prayers."17g The public record 
does not indicate who was responsible for this "strategy," but 
there can be no doubt that it was adopted. In any event, as the 
delay continued the threats began to  look empty, and the 
prayers went unanswered. Finally, some twenty months later, 
further stalling became impossible, and the Justice Department 
formally directed the Postal Service to withdraw its lawsuit. 
After this extremely tardy directive was predictably ignored, 
President Bush at last took action. On December 11, 1992, a 
president whose political resources had largely evaporated 
when he lost his bid for re-election took the extraordinary step 
of personally directing the Board of Governors to withdraw the 
lawsuit, on pain of dismissal. The Board voted six to five to 
defy the President, and the winning majority immediately went 
to court seeking an order to  block their threatened removal. 
The President responded by attempting to use his recess ap- 
pointment power to replace one of the Governors, which might 
have led to a reversal of the Board's narrow decision to  ignore 
his directive. 
The upshot of this litigation was a total victory for the 
Postal Service and a complete loss for the President. First, 
President Bush was subjected to an unprecedented court order 
forbidding him to discharge presidential appointees.'" Sec- 
ond, the court of appeals ruled that the Postal Service had the 
authority to bring suit against the Postal Rate Commission 
even in defiance of the president.lS1 The court firmly rejected 
the Justice Department's theory of the unitary executive, con- 
cluding that the judiciary may resolve disputes arising among 
executive agencies when authorized by statute to  do so.'" Fi- 
nally, although the Clinton administration continued to  defend 
Bush's recess appointment, that issue was also resolved against 
the pre~idency.'~ 
179. Devins, supra note 176. 
180. Mackie v. Bush, 809 F. Supp. 144, 148 (D.D.C. 1993), dismissed as moot 
sub nom. Mackie v. Clinton, 10 F.3d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
181. Mail Order Ass'n of Am. v. United States Postal Sew., 986 F.2d 509, 527 
(D.C. Cir. 1993). 
182. Id. at 527 & n.9. The Justice Department had also attempted to persuade 
the court that it had a statutory right to prevent the Postal Service from filing the 
lawsuit, but this argument, too, was rejected. Id. at 522. 
183. Mackie v. Clinton, 827 F. Supp. 56, 58 (D.D.C. 1993), vacated in part as 
moot, 1994 WL 163761 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
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Thus ended George Bush's experiment with presidential 
commitment to  the theories developed by the constitutional 
lawyers who saw themselves as the guardians of the presiden- 
cy. The Bush administration arrived where the Reagan admin- 
istration had so often found itself: begging the courts for relief 
from impositions that might have been avoided through the 
exercise of political will. One difference, however, is that while 
the Reagan administration at  least achieved some notable 
victories through litigation, as in Chadha and in Bowsher, the 
Bush administration seems to have contributed less than noth- 
ing to the few legal gains that the presidency made during its 
four years in office. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Perhaps the most obvious question raised by the Bush 
record on separation of powers is whether the absence of signal 
successes in enhancing or defending the office of the presidency 
resulted more from incompetence or from the operation of in- 
centives that caused the administration to  put greater value on 
achieving other goals. Examples like the postal service case 
and the airports litigation suggest that ineptitude played a 
significmt role, for in neither case does any strong overriding 
political or policy goal seem to explain the administration's 
failure to  defend the interests of the presidency. Poor execution 
of policy, however, occurs in all administrations (and all other 
large organizations), so examples like these are not necessarily 
very revealing. 
In this case, incompetence is not likely the sole or even 
principal explanatory factor even for those incidents in which it 
probably played an important part. In the airports matter, for 
example, the Justice Department became institutionally invest- 
ed in defending the congressional board of review during the 
Reagan administration. One would therefore have expected this 
defense to  have continued during the Bush administration, as 
it did, unless the new President's special commitment to polic- 
ing the separation of powers had been taken quite seriously. 
What this incident suggests more strongly than anything else 
is that the commitment communicated by the President was 
not strong enough to  overcome ordinary forces of bureaucratic 
inertia and personal egotism at the Justice Department. Sim- 
ilarly, the Postal Service case is probably best explained in 
terms of an unwillingness by the Justice Department to  request 
that the President take action in a matter that involved only 
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separation of powers principles (with no prospect of collateral 
political or policy benefits), during a period when both the 
President and the Department's senior officials had more politi- 
cally promising and seemingly urgent items competing for their 
time and attention. Both cases might have seemed quite impor- 
tant to  lawyers whose principal concern was constitutional law 
and the long-term effects of that law on the structure of gov- 
ernment, but neither case promised the President or the Attor- 
ney General any immediate political or policy payoff. The same 
kind of explanation seems to fit the Bush record taken as a 
whole. Consider each group of incidents analyzed in this paper: 
the compromises that followed the four vetoes that were based 
on objections to legislative encroachments on the president's 
authority; the Administration's support of the unconstitutional 
statutory appointment in the FIRREA legislation; and the 
virtual absence of a willingness to violate the many unconstitu- 
tional provisions (such as legislative vetoes) contained in legis- 
lation signed by the President. Taken together, all of these sug- 
gest that the defense of the presidency never assumed real 
importance in the Bush administration. 
The President's public pronouncements, however, as well 
as the prominent role that he assigned in his administration to 
lawyers known especially for their interest in separation of 
powers issues,'" and the extremely sc~pulous attention that 
was given to these issues in his signing statements and veto 
messages, suggest that these issues were deemed quite impor- 
tant by President Bush. Since Bush had little or nothing to 
gain from feigning this interest in the defense of his office, 
there is no reason to  suppose that his intellectual commitment 
to the issue was anything other than genuine. His 
administration's strong pattern of signfxant concessions, inac- 
tion at crucial moments, and downright self-destructiveness, 
therefore suggests that a more resolute pattern of behavior 
would have imposed short-term costs that the President and 
others around him simply proved unwilling to pay. One should 
184. The Counsel to the President, C. Boyden Gray, was generally considered 
to be among the most influential members of the White House staff. See, e.g., 
h e  Kornhauser, Boyden Gray: Not Just George Bush's Layer, LEGAL TIMES, 
Nov. 12, 1990, at 1. Bush's first Assistant Attorney General for OLC, William P. 
Ban; became known while in that office primarily for his defense of presidential 
authority, and was eventually promoted to Attorney General. Barr's successor at 
OLC, J. Michael Luttig, was one of only three officials in the Bush Justice Depart- 
ment to receive a coveted appointment to a United States court of appeals. 
THE DEFENSE OF THE PRESIDENCY 
expect other presidents and other administrations to  be subject 
to  the same incentives, and one should expect them to respond 
t o  those incentives in a similar manner. What makes the Bush 
administration unusual is only that the President and some of 
his lawyers seemed to think at the outset that this time things 
could be different. 
Those who hoped to assist President Bush in strengthening 
the office he temporarily held must have been personally disap- 
pointed in the outcome. Some of them may even have been 
disappointed in the President himself. Should other citizens 
share this sense of a missed opportunity? I suspect not, and I 
believe the reason has implications that go beyond the particu- 
lar incidents that so preoccupied the lawyers during the Bush 
administration. Whether in the context of the separation of 
powers or in that of ethics-and sometimes in both at once, as 
with Iran-Contra-the increased lawyerization of political dis- 
putes since Watergate has often submerged real disputes about 
substantive choices beneath distracting contests over abstract 
principles. This has probably had some healthy effects, for 
distractions can sometimes avert potentially destructive clash- 
es. And there would be poisonous long-term consequences if 
disputes over ethics issues and separation of powers were 
fought out as naked trials of political strength. But more of a 
good thing is not always better. The logic of reframing political 
disputes in legal terms can ultimately draw lawyers into the 
role of the client, a result that lawyers seldom find disagree- 
able. But it would be irresponsible for a President to let his 
lawyers determine how far he should push the defense of his 
constitutional prerogatives, just as it would be to cede the defi- 
nition of those prerogatives to Congress. The professional train- 
ing and professional obligations of lawyers do not qualifgr them 
for that task, however valuable and necessary their advice on 
the subject may be. 
George Bush and his administration may not have made 
all the right decisions in trying to balance the president's sub- 
stantive goals and his constitutional responsibilities to  his 
office. That would hardly distinguish his presidency from any 
other, and it ought not to obscure the fad that he at least did 
not leave his office significantly weaker in legal terms than 
when he assumed it. It is obvious that Bush might have weak- 
ened the presidency by offering too little resistance to an ag- 
gressive Congress. But it is equally true, and much less obvi- 
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ous, that he might also have weakened it by letting his lawyers 
effectively assume an office to which they were not elected. 
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AFTERWORD: A NOTI3 ON SOURCES AND METHODS 
The analysis presented in this article is based on a study of 
the public record, and those who are skeptical about its conclu- 
sions can test the evidence presented here against that record. 
This point deserves some emphasis because I worked in the 
Office of the Counsel to the President during the Bush admin- 
istration, and in OLC during the Reagan administration. Any- 
one with such a background might reasonably be supposed t o  
have the usual biases that arise when one has been involved 
with events and institutions that one later seeks to ex- 
plain.1g5 It should not be thought, however, that lack of direct 
involvement in government provides any assurance of impar- 
tiality in the study of government. Those who devote their time 
to the study of their own country's political institutions are not 
likely to be unaffected by their own political opinions, and 
those opinions need to be disciplined for the same reason and 
in much the same way as the biases of the former participant. 
The difficulties in preventing one's political beliefs from 
distorting one's analysis are particularly acute in the study of 
legal policy and separation of powers, where there is nothing 
like a political or academic consensus about the basic criteria 
that one could use to judge the performance of government 
officials and institutions. For that reason, scholars who work in 
this area cannot easily escape the necessity of acquiring a de- 
tailed familiarity with the legal issues and materials that legal 
policy-makers must grapple with in their own work. Such fa- 
miliarity is also needed to  avoid a different kind of shortcom- 
ing, because adequate analysis also requires independence from 
the explanations offered by policy-makers for their own con- 
duct. This afterword provides illustrations of both points, using 
examples drawn from two of the most detailed recent studies of 
the operation of the legal bureaucracies that have primary 
responsibility for separation of powers issues. 
Professor Cornell W. Clayton's critique of the Bush 
administration's approach to legal policy illustrates some of the 
pitfalls that can trap those who do not acquire a sufficient 
185. For an example of an uninhibitedly polemical account of the separation of 
powers controversies that took place during the Bush administration, one may 
consult TIEFER, supra note 109. Mr. Tiefer, a lawyer employed by the House of 
Representatives, views the Bush administration virtually as a reprise of the failed 
monarchies of Charles I and James 11. All three, according to Mr. Tiefer, were 
characterized by the pathologies of "the doctrine of personal rule." Id. at 20. 
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familiarity with the law.'" Professor Clayton, who sees the 
Bush approach to legal policy as an ill-advised extension of the 
Reagan administration's misguided efforts to increase its con- 
trol over the administrative state (and thereby to diminish 
congressional influence), concludes that a new alliance between 
the Justice Department and a conservative Supreme Court has 
implications that are "potentially far more dangerous to the 
rule of law" than previous presidential efforts to supervise legal 
admini~tration. '~~ Although this threat to "the rule of law" 
remains obscure in Professor Clayton's analysis, it seems to 
proceed from a notion that the "politicization" of legal policy by 
recent conservative presidents constitutes an improper evasion 
of congressional will.'" The best solution, Professor Clayton 
suggests, may be for Congress to remove the Justice Depart- 
ment from the president's control.'" 
Leaving aside the implausible suggestion that the Supreme 
Court's separation of powers jurisprudence would permit the 
president's authority over the Justice Department's core law 
enforcement functions to be taken away,lgO the legal materi- 
als that  Professor Clayton uses to support his thesis do not in  
fact support his claims. I will limit myself here to two examples 
that  are especially relevant to this article because they involve 
the Bush administration's approach to separation of powers. 
186. CLAYTON, supra note 29, at 226-36. 
187. Id. at 236. 
188. By "politicization," Professor Clayton apparently means that Reagan and 
Bush tried to ensure that the Justice Department acted on the President's views 
about legal policy rather than on the views held by career lawyers and congressio- 
nal liberals. See, e.g., id. at 204 ("By forgoing a [civil rights] legislative strategy 
and engaging in guerrilla warfare against Congress, the [Reagan] Justice Depart- 
ment created friction within the bureaucracy and isolated itself from congressional 
support."); id. at 224 ("In a system that vests legislative authority in Congress, any 
model of strong presidential leadership c a ~ o t  afford to set itself up as a competi- 
tor with Congress. If it does, the likely outcome will be stricter congressional con- 
trol of administration and greater judicial oversight of the executive."). Thus, Pro- 
fessor Clayton seems to think that strong leadership consists of preemptive surren- 
der and that the rule of law is fostered by presidents acquiescing in measures that 
they regard as illegal. 
189. Id. at 236. 
190. Professor Clayton seems t o  think that the Court's decision in Morrison v. 
Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), implies that such an action would be permissible, but 
he quotes nothing from Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion to support this sugges- 
tion. Actually, the Court emphasized that its holding was limited to sustaining the 
validity of certain statutory restrictions on the president's right to appoint and 
remove "Independent Counsel" who are chosen to conduct specific investigations 
into allegations of misconduct by government officials who might otherwise be able 
to prevent the enforcement of the law against themselves. 
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First, after claiming that the Bush administration went 
farther than its predecessors in using "signing statements t o  
gut congressional policies with which it di~agreed,"~~' Profes- 
sor Clayton offers as his only example a draR signing state- 
ment that the President never issued: 
In the most egregious example of this practice, Boyden Gray 
circulated a statement interpreting the 1991 Civil Rights Act 
so as to gut several key provisions, even before the bill was 
signed. . . . [The Gray directive] specifically attacked race 
preference policies and would have ended the use of prefer- 
ences and quotas in federal hiring. The directive was clearly 
an attempt to achieve administratively what the administra- 
tion was not able to achieve in its fight with Congress over 
the wording of the Civil Rights Act.'" 
Not only was the draft signing statement described here never 
issued,lg3 but Professor Clayton's characterization of it is de- 
monstrably inaccurate. Gray's draft would have required feder- 
al agencies to  terminate programs "that may be inconsistent 
with the new law or with the principle of discouraging quotas 
and unfair preferences. So-called 'race norming' of the General 
Aptitude Test Battery, for example, is plainly forbidden by 
section 106 of the new Act."lL The Gray draft would also 
191. CLAYTON, supra note 29, at 234. 
192. Id. 
193. Gray's drafk signing statement was circulated within the government 
through a standard interagency review process, which it survived. After the draft 
was leaked to the press, the President decided not to issue it. KOLB, supru note 
79, at 258. In a television interview, the President later indicated that his decision 
was based on apprehensions about the effects that misinterpretations of the docu- 
ment would have: 
MR. FROST: And is that why you stopped the Boyden Gray directive, 
because that would have gone too far? 
PRESIDENT BUSH: That had the appearance-it was an internal 
letter that went out to ask for comments from the various departments, 
which is all right to do. But it looked like, it looked like that it was 
positioning me as opposed to affirmative action. And it wasn't supposed to 
do that, and so we tried to correct all that. 
The President and Mrs. Bush '...Talking with David Frost,' (Jan. 3, 1992) (LEXIS, 
Nexis Library, FedNew File). 
The Gray draft is reprinted in David A. Cathcart & Mark Snyderman, The 
Civil Rights A d  of 1991 316-18 (Feb. 13, 1992) (study materials Q204 for Video 
Law Review sponsored by the American Law Institute-American Bar Association 
Committee on Continuing Professional Education and cosponsored by the Federal 
Judicial Center). 
194. See supra note 193. 
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have directed federal agencies to begin work on new employee 
selection guidelines, to  be "established under section 105 and 
other provisions of the Act," and it would have directed federal 
agencies to cease inducing employers "to violate the laws" by 
adopting quotas, preferences, and set-asides "on the basis of 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."lg5 In addition to  
the fact that the document focused on requiring federal agen- 
cies to  conform with the Civil Rights Act of 1991, including 
such specific provisions as the statute's flat prohibition of "race 
norming," there is not one word in that statute authorizing the 
kind of "quotas and unfair preferences" described in the draft. 
On the contrary, the statute specifically and expressly forbids 
"any employment practice [in which] race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin [is] a motivating factor . . . even though other 
factors also motivated the practi~e."'~~ Thus, the statute 
plainly and on its face dictates exactly the policy that Professor 
Clayton castigates Gray for recommending. 
This misinterpretation seems to have arisen from unfamil- 
iarity with the relevant legal materials and background. At one 
point, for example, Professor Clayton makes the following 
statement about the Bush Justice Department: "In Wards Cove 
v. Antonio [sic] (1 gag), Patterson v. McClean Credit Union 
(1989), and City of Richmond v. Croson (1989), the department 
argued and finally won a majority of the Court to  accept its 
position that the use of disparate impact evidence under Title 
[ W ]  should be re~tricted."'~' This sentence contains several 
195. See supra note 193. 
196. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 
1075. In a carefully worded proviso that is rife with deliberate ambiguities, the 
statute also declares that nothing in it should be "construed to affect court-ordered 
remedies, affirmative action, or conciliation agreements, that are in accordance with 
the law." Id. 8 116, 105 Stat., 1071, 1079. It may be possible to construct an argu- 
ment, resting in part on section 116, for construing section 107 to mean the op- 
posite of what it says, but that would hardly be a sufficient basis for concluding 
that Gray was trying to "gut congressional policies" when he proposed a directive 
implementing the exact policy commanded by the plain language of a new law that 
Congress had just passed. For completely opposing views on what the "congressio- 
nal policy" underlying these two provisions was, see 137 CONG. REC. S15472, 
S15476, S15477-78 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (memorandum submitted by Sen. Dole 
on behalf of himself, thirteen other Senators, and the Bush administration); id. at 
H9526, H9529, H9530 (memorandum submitted by Rep. Don Edwards). 
In any event, even if one assumes that section 107 means something com- 
pletely Merent from what it says, there is absolutely nothing in the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991 or anywhere else in the law requiring the president or the federal 
agencies that he supervises to implement or encourage the kind of quota hiring or 
other "unfair preferences" described in the Gray draft. 
197. CLAYTON, supra note 29, at 231 (endnote omitted). Professor Clayton's 
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errors. First, none of these cases was briefed or argued during 
the Bush administration. Second, Patterson had nothing to do 
with disparate impact evidence or with Title VII, and the Court 
rejected the position advocated by the Justice Department in 
that case. Third, the Croson decision had nothing to do with 
either of these issues or with any other federal statute. In a 
note appended to this sentence, Professor Clayton says that 
"Congress overturned these decisions by passing the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991."198 The 1991 statute in fact codified large 
parts of Wards Cove, including its holding, and unambiguously 
"overturned" only one relatively minor dictum. The 1991 Act 
overturned Patterson, but in doing so it adopted the position 
advocated by the Bush administration throughout the legisla- 
tive debate, which in turn was consistent with the position 
taken by the Justice Department in the Patterson litigation 
itself. Finally, the 1991 Act contains no provisions that have 
anything to do with the legal issue in the Croson case. 
A second example of difficulties that can ensue when com- 
plex legal issues are treated in too summary a fashion arises in 
Professor Clayton's discussion of the relation between the Su- 
preme Court's Chevron doctrine (which requires judicial defer- 
ence to federal agencies' interpretations of statutes in certain 
circumstances) and Justice Scalia's views on the use of legisla- 
tive history in statutory construction. According t o  Professor 
Clayton, the Bush Justice Department was engaged in a "quest 
t o  get the Supreme Court to  place more stringent limitations 
on lower court review of administrative action."1gg The key to 
this effort, we are told, was Justice Scalia, who has "champi- 
oned broad application of the Chevron standards" and who "has 
argued that lower courts should ignore congressional intent 
altogether as a basis for reviewing administrative action.77200 
At best, these are caricatures of Justice Scalia's positions. 
Taking the second allegation first, Professor Clayton cites two 
of Scalia's opinions (one for the Court and one concurring in 
the Court's judgment) to  support his description of Scalia's 
position on congressional intent.201 But neither case involved 
book refers to "Title VI" rather than to Title VII, but I presume that this was a 
typographical error. 
198. Id. at 231, 238 11.28. 
199. Id. at 234. 
200. Id. 
201. Id. at 234-35 (discussing Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 
597 (1991), and West Virginia Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991)). 
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a review of any federal administrative interpretation, and nei- 
ther opinion advocates ignoring congressional intent. In neither 
case, nor anywhere else that I am aware of, has Scalia even 
suggested that lower courts should adopt different principles in 
interpreting statutes than the Supreme Court should. Nor do I 
believe that Scalia has ever contended that any court should 
"ignore congressional intent altogether.'' 
Professor Clayton's notion that Scalia wants to  "ignore 
congressional intent altogether" seems to proceed from a mis- 
understanding of Scalia's views about the use of legislative 
history in statutory construction: "According to [Scalia's] view, 
all that is important is the language of [the] statute, not 
Congress' efforts to explain what its statutes mean through 
committee reports or legislative histories."202 So far as I am 
aware, however, Scalia has never asserted that courts should 
ignore the legislative history of a statute when it provides the 
most probative evidence of a statute's meaning, and Professor 
Clayton cites no such assertion. Scalia has argued, in consider- 
able detail and in a variety of contexts, that courts should not 
unnecessarily substitute inferences drawn from the legislative 
history of statutes (which consists of statements by entities 
other than Congress, such as congressional committees and 
individual members) for inferences drawn from the statute 
itself (which is the only thing that Congress has actually voted 
on). Some of what Scalia has said about the complex and diffi- 
cult subject of statutory construction is controversial, and it 
deserves debate. One cannot, however, properly evaluate the 
validity of Scalia's views, or understand their relation to vari- 
ous doctrines involving the separation of powers, unless one 
begins with what he has actually said. 
Professor Clayton's depiction of Scalia as a champion of a 
"broad application" of the Chevron doctrine is more surprising 
than his rendition of Scalia's views on legislative intent. Cheu- 
ron was decided, by a unanimous Court, before Scalia even 
became a Jus t i~e .2~~ Scalia has adhered t o  that precedent, 
and he appears to regard it as a sound decision.2M But he is 
202. CLAYTON, supra note 29, at 234. 
203. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837 (1984). 
204. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-55 (1987) (Scalia, J. 
concurring in the judgment); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative 
Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511. 
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not a champion of an especially "broad application" of the doc- 
trine. On the contrary, Scalia seems exceptionally unlikely to 
find that particular statutes are sufficiently ambiguous to  trig- 
ger Chevron deferen~e.~" He has, moreover, forcefully argued 
against extending deference to  agency interpretations of stat- 
utes (and rejected interpretations by the Reagan and Bush 
administrations) in circumstances not directly governed by 
Chevron.206 The only decision involving Chevron that Profes- 
sor Clayton discusses, however, is Rust v. S u l l i ~ a n ~ ~ '  a case 
in which Scalia did not write a single word of any of the four 
opinions that were filed. 
Rust is also an odd case to use as evidence of a "quest to 
get the Supreme Court to place more stringent limitations on 
lower court review of administrative action."208 As Professor 
Clayton acknowledges, the Court's decision was "consistent 
with the Chevron precedent.''20g Rust generated considerable 
controversy, on and off the Court, but the serious questions 
that were raised had to do with abortion and the First Amend- 
ment, not with Chevron. And even on those questions, Profes- 
sor Clayton's analysis misses the mark. 
Rust arose from an agency's re-interpretation of a statute 
that forbids the use of certain federal funds "in programs 
where abortion is a method of family planning."210 These 
205. See, e.g., Maislin Indus., US., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 US. 116, 
136-38 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. 486 US. 281, 
318-28 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Scalia, supra 
note 204. 
206. See, e.g., Crandon v. United States, 494 US. 152, 177 (1990) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the judgment); NLRB v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 481 
US. 573 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
207. 500 US. 173 (1991). 
208. CLAYTON, supra note 29, at 234. In Rust, the Supreme Court ffirmed the 
judgments reached by both of the lower courts in that case. 
209. Id. at 235. 
210. The fad that the agency had previously interpreted the statute different- 
ly, a fad that appears to bother Professor Clayton considerably, was not an impor- 
tant issue in Rust. Chevron itself upheld a regulation that had reversed the 
agency's previous position. Chevron USA. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun- 
sel, Inc., 467 US. 837, 865 (1984). Subsequent case law has confirmed that agen- 
cies are free to revise their interpretations of ambiguous statutes without thereby 
triggering increased judicial skepticism: 
To be sustained as reasonable, the agency interpretation need not be the 
only permissible one, and if reasonable it wiU be upheld even though the 
court might have construed the statute differently. The agency may 
change its view, provided the new interpretation is consistent with the 
statute and reasonable, and the change was based on reasoned decision- 
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funds were directed at caring for women who were not preg- 
nant; if a pregnancy occurred the woman was referred to  other 
programs that were not governed by the statutory restriction at  
issue. Based on its interpretation of this statute, the agency 
issued regulations forbidding federally funded family-planning 
clinics from promoting abortion. Among the forbidden activities 
were counselling women who became pregnant to procure an 
abortion, and referring them to  other clinics that specialize in 
performing abortions. The regulations allowed patients to  be 
given lists of pre-natal care providers, which might include 
providers who performed abortions, but patients were not sup- 
posed to be "steered" toward those that offered abortion as a 
method of family planning. 
A narrowly divided Supreme Court upheld the validity of 
these regulations, concluding that the regulations were based 
on a permissible interpretation of the statute; that the regula- 
tions did not infringe the First Amendment rights of those who 
were forbidden to use federal funds to promote or procure abor- 
tions; and that the Court's abortion jurisprudence did not com- 
pel the government to  subsidize abortion-related activities. 
Colorable arguments could be made against the Court's deci- 
sion, as they were by some of the dissenting Justices. Those 
arguments, however, cannot be properly evaluated unless one 
separates the legal issues from whatever strong feelings one 
may have about the propriety of using public funds to promote 
abortion. 
Professor Clayton's analysis, unfortunately, does not begin 
with the requisite separation of legal from political issues. 
First, his off-handed description of the regulations as a "gag 
d e n 2 1 1  obscures the legal issue. Many laws and regulations 
restrict the ability of federal grantees to  use the money they 
receive for certain kinds of advocacy. Few of these are ever 
making, adequately explained. Thus, there need be no single true and 
enduring interpretation. Where Congress has not dewtively spoken, 
agency interpretation is largely a matter of discretionary policy-making, 
the "wisdom" of which is of no concern to a reviewing court. 
Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the 
Courts?, 7 YALE J .  ON REG. 1, 27-28 (1990) (footnotes omitted); see also Michael 
Herz, Textualism and Taboo: Interpretation and Deference for Justice Scalia, 12 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1671 (1991) ("[IN is generally understood that Chevron has re- 
moved the stigma from agency flip-flops [in cases where the statute is ambigu- 
ous]."). 
211. CLAYTON, supra note 29, at 236. 
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challenged, and they are rarely condemned with epithets like 
"gag rule." This is political rhetoric that even the most passion- 
ate of the dissenting Justices in Rust did not employ. Second, it 
is highly misleading to say that the Court "allowed the admin- 
istration to  attach an otherwise unconstitutional condition to 
the receipt of public funds."212 This use of the word "other- 
wise," without further discussion, clouds one of the more legally 
important issues in the case. All the Justices, like everyone 
else who is familiar with the relevant precedents, agreed that 
the government may sometimes attach "an otherwise unconsti- 
tutional condition to the receipt of public funds."213 The dif- 
ficult questions, on which the Court was divided in this case, 
have to do with when such conditions are permissible and 
when they are impermi~sible.~" Third, there is not one state- 
ment in the Rust Court's opinion t o  support Professor Clayton's 
claim that the Court was willing "to abandon what it thinks 
Congress intended."215 Finally, it is difficult even to imagine 
what is meant when Professor Clayton says, after noting that 
President Bush vetoed a bill that would have overruled Rust, 
that the Court's willingness to "stand idly by while the Presi- 
dent uses his veto to prevent corrective legislation must be 
viewed with alarm."216 For over two centuries, the courts 
have been standing "idly by" when presidents have used the 
veto. This is because the Constitution contains no provisions 
authorizing the courts to overrule presidential vetoes, any more 
than it contains provisions authorizing the courts to overrule 
congressional failures to  enact legislation. One can safely pre- 
dict that the sudden assumption of such authority by the courts 
would be viewed with considerably more alarm by informed 
observers than anything that happened in connection with the 
Rust decision. 
2 12. Id. 
213. Justice Blackmuds dissent, for example, correctly noted that the case 
raised an issue about "the extent to which the Government may attach an other- 
wise unconstitutional condition to the receipt of a public benefit," and observed 
that this issue "implicates a troubled area of our jurisprudence." Rust v. Sullivan, 
500 U.S. 173, 209 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
214. The majority, for example, acknowledged that its analysis was not meant 
"to suggest that funding by the Government, even when coupled with the freedom 
of the fund recipients to speak outside the scope of the Government-funded project, 
is invariably sufficient to justify government control of the content of expression." 
Id. at 205 (majority opinion). 
215. CLAYTON, supra note 29, at 236. 
216. Id. 
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Professor Clayton's critique of the Bush administration 
thus illustrates some of the difficulties that can arise because 
of the relative inaccessibility of legal materials to researchers 
trained in other fields. It may be possible to defend some parts 
of his thesis, but doing so would require finding evidence far 
more powerful than anything he has provided. 
Professor James Michael Strine's analysis of OLC illus- 
trates a different kind of constraint on students of legal bu- 
reaucracies. Professor Strine's ambitious study seeks to avoid 
the oversimplifications of prior scholarship by using social role 
theory to show how "[v]alues of professionalism and political 
responsibility provided relatively enduring institutional con- 
straints in the growth of the Justice Department."217 By fo- 
cusing on what he calls "psychological role strain," Professor 
Strine tries to show that the behavior of OLC can best be ex- 
plained as the product of ongoing efforts by individual lawyers 
to resolve a n  inherent tension between professional norms that 
seem to call for "an idealized, neutral administration of law" 
with the demands of other governmental actors (most notably 
the White House Counsel's office) for allegiance to the 
president's agendae218 
Professor Strine's approach offers a valuable supplement to 
previous efforts because of its focus on the interplay between 
the choices made by government lawyers and the constraints of 
the environment in which they operate. His study of this inter- 
play also recognizes the difficulties imposed by the confidential 
nature of OLC's work. In an effort to overcome these difficul- 
ties, Professor Strine undertook detailed case studies of several 
major legal controversies in which OLC was involved, relying 
heavily on documentary evidence available from sources such 
as congressional hearings and presidential archives, as well as 
on interviews with people who had been involved with OLC. 
The discipline imposed by this method had worthwhile results, 
and many of Professor Strine's conclusions are unexceptionable. 
In certain respects, however, I believe the analysis was carried 
astray because his methodology was not able to compensate 
adequately for the constraints imposed by the sources. 
One example can be found in the sympathy that Professor 
Strine displays for the OLC lawyers who he believes must 
make difficult choices between their professional obligations 
217. Strine, supra note 18, at 30. 
218. See id. at 30-33. 
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and the political demands placed on them by others in the 
government. At one point he says: 
For lawyers in the OLC, independence differentiated them 
from the presidential sycophants in the White House Counsel. 
Searching for a role in the wake of organizational turmoil, 
lawyers at the OLC abandoned the practice of balancing polit- 
ical and professional values in favor [of] an ethic of indepen- 
dent, principled interpretation of the law. The OLC lawyers 
believed in their independent conception of the Constitution 
and the professionalist ideology of the legal process. The re- 
sult of these changes was an OLC willing to adjudicate inter- 
agency disputes and pursue direct legal confrontations with 
Congress.219 
It is no doubt true that some OLC lawyers have regarded those 
who worked in the White House Counsel's office as "presiden- 
tial sycophants," and believed that their own motivations were 
fmer and purer. Uncritical acceptance of this view of OLC law- 
yers, however, obscures the possibility that OLC lawyers have 
sometimes used this image of themselves to justify actions 
taken at least in part for other reasons. 
Professor Strine's view of OLC "professionalism" also fails 
to distinguish between the incentives operating on OLC staff 
lawyers (who have strong incentives to  adopt an "ethic of inde- 
pendent, principled interpretation of the law") and the incen- 
tives operating on OLC's Assistant Attorney General (who ordi- 
narily has even stronger incentives to play ball with the "presi- 
dential sycophants" in the White H~use).''~ One consequence 
of Professor Strine's acceptance of the flattering self-image that 
OLC lawyers like to  project is that he has great difficulty in ex- 
plaining why the supposedly institutionalized conflict between 
OLC and the White House Counsel's office-whose develop- 
ment through several decades of administrative history he 
chronicles in great detail-seems to  have suddenly and inexpli- 
cably evaporated with the advent of the Bush administra- 
tion.'" As I have tried to show in this article, simple self- 
219. Id. at 312-13. 
220. For a detailed analysis of the incentive structures that shape OLC's be- 
havior, see Lund, supra note 52. 
221. Thus, for example, Professor Strine states that "[clhanges in lawyers at 
the White House and the Justice Department did not stop the rising rivalry be- 
tween the two counsellors." Strine, supra note 18, at 314. Elsewhere, however, he 
acknowledges that "[tlhe unity of opinion between Bush's White House Counsel and 
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interest provides a better explanation for the behavior of those 
who provide legal advice t o  the president than psychological 
role strain. The economic model of human behavior has an 
important advantage over Professor Strine's theory of psycho- 
logical role strain. While Professor Strine's model may throw 
some light on the behavior of some individuals at certain times, 
it is does not supply a general explanation of the mechanisms 
by which the social environment influences individual choice, 
and it is not well suited for making testable predictions. 
I hope that this article has illustrated how the use of eco- 
nomic analysis and detailed case studies of legal policy-making 
can avoid some of the problems encountered by Professors 
Clayton and Strine. My own analysis, of course, should be test- 
ed against all of the available evidence, and it should be reject- 
ed in favor of any better approach that can be devised. 
the Justice Department extended to all separation of powers issues." Id. at 298. 
Professor Strine offers no examples from the Bush administration suggesting that 
the two offices operated on the basis of Merent conceptions of the proper hnction 
of a presidential legal advisor. 
